scholarly journals Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 771-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENS DAVID OHLIN

AbstractBoth the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have struggled to combine vertical and horizontal modes of liability. At the ICTY, the question has primarily arisen within the context of ‘leadership-level’ joint criminal enterprises (JCEs) and how to express their relationship with the relevant physical perpetrators (RPPs) of the crimes. The ICC addressed the issue by combining indirect perpetration with co-perpetration to form a new mode of liability known as indirect co-perpetration. The following article argues that these novel combinations – vertical and horizontal modes of liability – cannot be simply asserted; they must be defended at the level of criminal-law theory. Unfortunately, courts that have applied indirect co-perpetration have generally failed to offer this defence and have simply assumed that modes of liability can be combined at will. In an attempt to offer the needed justification, this article starts with the premise that modes of liability are ‘linking principles’ that link defendants with particular actions, and that combining these underlying linking principles requires a second-order linking principle. The most plausible candidate is the personality principle – a basic principle that recognizes the inherently collective nature of leadership-level groups dedicated to committing international crimes. Like Roxin's theories describing the collective organizations that can be used as a form of indirect perpetration, the personality principle treats the horizontal leadership group as an organization or group agent whose collective nature potentially justifies the attribution of vertical modes of liability to all members of the horizontal group. Although this article does not defend the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration, it does conclude that combined vertical and horizontal modes of liability, whether at the ICTY or ICC, implicitly or covertly rely on something like the personality principle in order to justify collective attribution to the horizontal collective.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia

Legacy is a matter that may become topical when its creator finally stops producing. Normally, the silent years would be many before the thought of legacy enters into open, formal discourse among lawyers and decision-makers. This comment treats the meaning of the word as relative to the circumstances in which it is invoked. The more closely it is used in relation to the present, the more distant it drifts from its literal meaning, to the extent that it denotes what the word “impact” signifies. This essay questions whether the word “legacy” is apt in describing the footprint of the work of the two ad hoctribunals in China, where its influence has, as a matter of fact, been waning ever since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (“Rome Statute” ). The Chinese example suggests that the work of the tribunals is (at least so far) no more significant to international criminal law than the illustrious Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of the 1940s. The most major impact (a more apposite term than legacy) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for China may be that China’s policy with regard to the tribunals, manifested mostly in the United Nations, has determined its approach to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” ). For that, the work of the tribunals could be considered as having left China something in the nature of an indirect legacy.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Garkawe

AbstractThe Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (the "ICC") agreed to in Rome in 1998 contains many provisions that deal with the specific concerns and rights of victims and survivors of the international crimes that the ICC will have jurisdiction over. It consolidates the work of the two ad hoc international criminal Tribunals (the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) in this area, but also further enhances the role and rights of victims in a number of innovative ways. These three international criminal Tribunals thus collectively represent an important step forward in the recognition of the suffering and the position of victims and survivors of international crimes. This article will examine three main issues in relation to victims and the ICC. First, after identifying the protective measures for victims allowed at the discretion of the international criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it will focus on the most controversial measure (which the ICC can also order) - the non-disclosure to the defence of the identity of witnesses. Does this protective measure violate a defendant's right to a fair trial? The Statute of the ICC also allows, for the first time in international criminal justice, for the right of victims to obtain their own legal representation, subject to the discretion of the ICC. The second issue is how is this going to work in practice in light of the fact that international crimes normally involve hundreds, if not thousands or even tens of thousands, of victims? And finally, while the ICC Statute provides for the possibility of reparations to victims, where will the money come from, and thus what are the chances of victims actually being able to receive compensation?


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-91
Author(s):  
Michael Lysander Fremuth

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 constitutes a landmark in the development of International Criminal Law (ICL), which gained its first momentum after World War II through the foundation of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. ICL is, however, not confined to these most prominent courts or their statutes providing for definitions of international crimes under their respective jurisdiction; rather, ad hoc international, or internationalized and hybrid special tribunals and criminal chambers also contribute to the development and shape of ICL and reflect its diverse legal and institutional basis. Perceived as another tribunal of “international character,” on August 18, 2020, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) pronounced its judgment on the merits in the Ayyash case. The long-awaited verdict raises the question of the Tribunal's contribution to the further evolution of ICL.


Author(s):  
Frédéric Mégret

One of the most significant contributions of Bill Schabas to the study of international criminal law is his critique of the tendency of contemporary international criminal justice to focus on individuals associated with non-state actors as opposed to states. This chapter seeks to first evaluate it as an empirical claim to assess the degree to which the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, if at all, disproportionately focused on non-state actors, beyond the well-known case of state self-referrals. It then addresses the normative case against such an evolution. The real issue is jurisdictional and a matter of prosecutorial policy rather than the substantive one of whether non-state groups can commit international crimes. The conclusion envisages what it is that is common between states and certain armed groups that ought to give a particular character of gravity to their acts and recommend them for special attention from international criminal law and justice.


Author(s):  
Robert Cryer

This chapter examines the material and mental aspects of four offences that are directly criminalized by international law: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The discussions also cover some of the general principles of liability and defences that are of particular relevance to international crimes. Firstly, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration, command responsibility, and the defence of obedience to superior orders are considered. The chapter then looks at international and national prosecution of international crimes, including the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. As prosecution is not the only, or predominant, response to international crimes, the chapter concludes with a discussion of alternatives and complements to prosecution, such as amnesties, and truth and reconciliation commissions.


Author(s):  
Miguel de Serpa Soares

The chapter sets the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) legacy into context from a broader UN perspective. It shows that ideas of morality and responsibility are fundamental to the establishment of the ICTY and a cornerstone of the ‘age of accountability’. The chapter argues that the ICTY had a pioneering role in shaping discourse on international justice and serious international crimes and institutional developments, ranging from the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM). It discusses four challenges that are fundamental to the development of an international accountability system: the financing of international criminal court and tribunals; the length of proceedings; the development of governance mechanisms; and the centrality of the role of victims. The chapter concludes that, in an ideal world, institutions such as the ICTY would not be needed. However, until such a time arrives, the legacy of the ICTY can provide important insights on building domestic capacity and guiding other international tribunals.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 28 consists of two paragraphs; the first addressing superior responsibility in a military context, the second dealing with the issue with respect to civilians. Unlike the superior responsibility liability that attaches to military commanders, which was well accepted, application of the concept to civilians proved to be very controversial. Some Trial Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have referred to article 28 as a basis for the view that the ‘distinction between military commanders and other superiors embodied in the Rome Statute is an instructive one’, although this is a rather isolated opinion. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has acknowledged that whether the liability of civilian superiors ‘contains identical elements to that of military commanders is not clear in customary law’.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

No one seriously disputes that the individual is a subject of international criminal law. But it is much less certain whether international crimes a priori entail individual responsibility, which would be in line with the ‘individualistic’ conception of international legal personality, or whether the responsibility arises a posteriori consistent with the Kelsenian approach. Following a brief account of some historical antecedents, Chapter6 provides a detailed examination of the pivotal post-Second World War trials and the subsequent development of individual responsibility for international crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Moreover, the chapter shows that the common practice of categorizing criminal courts as either international, internationalized, or domestic according to the ‘involvement of the international community’ ultimately rests on the orthodox ‘States-only’ conception of international legal personality.


2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 803-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Cryer ◽  
Paul David Mora

As a precursor to the United Kingdom's ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2001, the respective Parliaments in the UK adopted two Acts to implement the obligations that treaty imposed on the UK, and to implement the international crimes, as defined in that treaty, into the law of the UK. When the International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act) was being debated in 2001, Baroness Scotland, speaking for the Government, explained that part of the raison d'etre of the Act was that the UK ought not to be seen as a safe haven for international criminals. However, in line with article 11 of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of UK courts over such offences, insofar as they were not already covered by the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and the Genocide Act 1969 (the latter of which was repealed by the ICC Act) only applied prospectively.


Author(s):  
Nataliia Plakhotniuk ◽  
Maryna Irzhova

The article emphasizes that the crime of aggression is considered the most serious crime against peace since the Nuremberg Tribunal,which is recognized by both domestic and Western doctrine. Amendments to the Rome Statute in 2010 defined signs of aggressionas an international crime and clarified the rules for exercising the jurisdiction of the International criminal court. Optimistic expectationsfor establishing effective jurisdiction of the court over this international crime have been dashed. As a result, it is concluded thateffective international criminal prosecution of the crime of aggression is possible only if the norms of the Rome Charter that cause themost negative reaction from the leading States are reviewed.It should be noted that in respect of a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction overthe crime of aggression committed by nationals of that state or on its territory.The International criminal court should serve as a symbol of international justice, which makes just decisions related to violationsof international law. As for the procedure for implementing the proceedings of the International criminal court, it is worth noting thatsuch a procedure for executing the decision of the ISS is double. The dual procedure for the enforcement of decisions of the InternationalCriminal Court is the Foundation of the Rome Charter and represents a new system in the history of public international law inthe field of international responsibility.Thus, it is possible to see that although at first glance the long process of formulating and adopting a unified definition of thecrime of aggression at the international level to succeed, thorough the consideration allows you to comprehend the profound incompletenessof this process. Features of the crime of aggression provided for in the draft edits the Rome Statute, as well as the amendmentmechanism itself, illustrate the real lack of a mechanism for holding individuals internationally responsible for its Commission, as wellas the rather disappointing prospect of positive changes in the near future.Despite the conflicts that arise between the norms of national criminal law and the provisions of the ISS Charter, the procedureitself is an effective legal instrument aimed at maintaining international peace and security. The joint work of the International CriminalCourt and the UN Security Council makes it possible to try cases of international crimes and take effective measures to counter suchcrimes. As a key component of the International criminal justice system, the International criminal Court is one of the most significantinstitutions of international criminal law, which is constantly developing and to a certain extent affects the patterns in the developmentof mechanisms for the investigation of international crimes and the protection of human rights at the international and national levels.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document