Fraud & Abuse: Fourth Circuit Holds Eleventh Amendment Bars Qui Tam Suit Against State in Federal Court

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-202
Author(s):  
Allan Gomes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
False Claims Act ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Federal Intervention ◽  
Private Citizen ◽  
Northern District ◽  
Eleventh Amendment ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled, in United States u. Texus Tech University, 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private citizen from bringing a qui tam action in federal court against a state, absent federal intervention.Intervenor Carol Foulds was a dermatology resident at the Texas Tech Health Services Center. While a resident, Foulds examined patients, made diagnoses, and prescribed treatments for patients. Foulds alleged that she and other residents performed these medical services without the supervision of staff physicians. Foulds further alleged that, after residents performed these services without physician oversight, staff physicians signed charts and Medicare and Medicaid billing forms certifying that they personally performed or supervised the administration of these services. Foulds estimates approximately 500,000 false claims occurred in a span of ten years.In 1995, Foulds filed a qui tam action with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As regulated by the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (West 1998), the complaint remained under seal.

Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International Law

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 783-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl M. Meessen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
District Court ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Northern District ◽  
Legal Writing ◽  
The U.S

When, on October 24, 1983, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California handed down its decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America and denied U.S. jurisdiction out of regard for the Honduran “system of justice,” there may have been some surprise that the case was still pending. The Timberlane decision of 1976 of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the matter to the district court, had already become a classic, even though it was preceded by the 1968 decision in United States v. First National City Bank on the production of documents located abroad. The Timberlane approach outlined by Judge Choy, under which the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction has to be restrained by a case-by-case analysis of various factors, was widely discussed (and usually praised) in legal writing, and was also followed by federal courts of the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.

Court Allows ERISA Plan Participants to Sue Administrator for Physicians' Actions

1995 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-408
Author(s):  
B.G.
Keyword(s):  
Federal Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
State Court ◽  
Insurance Plan ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Malpractice Suit ◽  
Northern District ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Health Laws ◽  
The U.S

On December 7, 1994, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois ruled that ERISA preempts a participant in an ERISA plan from suing the plan's administrator under a state common law theory of respondeat superior (Rice v. Panchal, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill. 1994)) (see, “Recent Developments in Health Laws,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 23 (1995): at 208). On September 12, 1995, the Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed this decision and ordered that the case be tried in state court (Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995)). The court held that the case had been improperly removed to federal court. The court of appeals stated that the federal court did not have jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claim did not fall within ERISA's provisions.In this case, plaintiff David Rice brought a medical malpractice suit against two doctors who provided treatment to him in accordance with his ERISA insurance plan.

United States v. Stuart

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 918-923
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Price
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
District Court ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
Justice Department ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
History Of ◽  
The U.S

In response to a request by Canadian tax authorities under the United States-Canada Double Taxation Convention (Convention), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued summonses to obtain U.S. bank records concerning certain accounts of respondents, Canadian citizens whose Canadian tax liability was under investigation. Respondents sought to quash the summonses, arguing that because under 26 U.S.C. §7609(b) the IRS is prohibited by U.S. law from using its summons authority to obtain information about a U.S. taxpayer once a case is referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, and because the tax investigation of respondents was part of a Canadian criminal investigation, the IRS should be precluded from using its summons authority to honor the Canadian request under the Convention. Unsuccessful in the district court, respondents prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that under the “good faith” standard applicable to enforcement of domestic summonses, the IRS may issue a summons pursuant to a Convention request only if it first determines and makes an affirmative statement to the effect that the Canadian investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. The U.S. Supreme Court (per Brennan, J.) reversed, and held: (1) that if the summons is issued in good faith, it is enforceable regardless of whether the Canadian request is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law; and (2) neither United States law nor anything in the text or the ratification history of the Convention supports the imposition of additional requirements. Justice Kennedy (joined by O’Connor, J.), concurring in part and in the judgment, filed a brief opinion to state his view that it is unnecessary to decide whether Senate preratification materials are authoritative sources for treaty interpretation. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to oppose the use of such materials in treaty construction.

Briefly Noted

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1054-1055
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Native American ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
The U.S

On August 23, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Mitchell v. U.S., denying a certificate of appealability to the petitioner who sought a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence of death. The petitioner, Lezmond Mitchell, argued that his conviction and sentence must be vacated in light of an August 12, 2020, report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that concluded that Mr. Mitchell's trial and sentence were a violation of his rights under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Mr. Mitchell, the only Native American on federal death row, argued that the IACHR report created rights binding on the U.S. “‘(1) because they are derived directly from the OAS Charter, a treaty within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) because they are derived, through the OAS Charter, from the American Declaration, a statement of human rights norms the United States has not only adopted, but helped to draft.’” The Ninth Circuit concluded that Mr. Mitchell's motion to vacate “did not make ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right’” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and denied his motion. In its reasoning, the Court explained that “reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the IACHR's decision is not binding in federal court.” It agreed with the District Court's conclusion that IACHR rulings are not binding on the U.S. because the OAS Charter is “not self-executing” and there is no U.S. statute which implements it. Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that because the American Declaration is not a treaty, it creates no binding legal obligations, nor does the “IACHR's governing statute, the Statute of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights . . . give the IACHR power to make binding rulings with respect to nations, like the United States, that have not ratified the American Convention.” The Ninth Circuit thus joins the other federal courts of appeals that have addressed this issue by concluding that neither the American Declaration, nor the IACHR's recommendations related thereto, is a source of binding obligations for the United States under international law. Cf. Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 2016); Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 991, 997–98 (5th Cir. 2014); Flores-Nova v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 652 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2011); Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 n. 11 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Hicks, 375 F.3d 1237, 1241 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2004); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2001); Roach v. Aiken, 781 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1986).

U.S. Federal Court of Appeals Upholds United Nations' Immunity in Case Related to Cholera in Haiti

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 162-170
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Southern District ◽  
Health Screenings ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The U.S

On October 9, 2013, a group of Haitian cholera victims and their survivors sued the United Nations, along with two UN officials and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the United Nations had negligently and recklessly allowed peacekeepers from Nepal carrying cholera to enter Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake without reasonable health screenings. The suit further alleged that the United Nations had negligently maintained inadequate sanitation facilities. Finally, the petitioners alleged that the United Nations’ refusal to accept responsibility for the outbreak had exacerbated the epidemic. According to the United Nations, by August 2016, nearly 800,000 people had become infected with cholera, and more than 9,000 had died of cholera.

Desir v. Ilchert

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 830-832
Author(s):  
Susan Burke
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Social Group ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Political Opinion ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Northern District

Plaintiff, a Haitian seeking asylum in the United States, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, to overturn a denial of asylum by both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The plaintiff sought asylum under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (1982)) (INA) on the basis of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The district court upheld the BIA decision, which allowed deportation of the plaintiff because the incidents of persecution in Haiti were economically rather than politically motivated. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (per Tang, J.) reversed, holding that the plaintiff had demonstrated persecution based on political opinion by showing a pattern of extortion by government officials, and remanded for a determination of whether the plaintiff would be persecuted upon his return to Haiti.

Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc.

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 820-824
Author(s):  
Michael R. Calabrese
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Steel Company ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Sandinista Revolution ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
The U.S

The former majority shareholders of Industria Nacional de Clavos y Alambres de Puas, S.A. (INCA), a large Nicaraguan steel company, sought to recover from Harlow & Jones, Inc. (H & J), a U.S. steel company, the purchase price of a shipment of undelivered steel billets. Following the Sandinista revolution, the Nicaraguan Government had “intervened” in INCA and it, too, demanded the funds that H & J interpleaded into the court. The district court rejected the claim of the Sandinista Government and allocated the funds to the benefit of all parties who held shares in the company prior to the intervention. On cross-appeals by the claimants, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (per Kaufman, J.) affirmed in part and reversed in part, and held: the act of state doctrine does not bar judicial resolution of the dispute over the funds; the actions of the Sandinista Government amounted to a taking without compensation that will not be enforced by the U.S. courts; and the district court’s allocation of pro rata shares for all of the preintervention stockholders, including minority interests, was equitable.

National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. the M/T Stolt Sheaf

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 368-371
Author(s):  
Jerome M. Marcus
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
District Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Southern District ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

In an action brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, plaintiff, the National Petrochemical Co. of Iran (NPC), sought damages against Monnris Enterprises of Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, Rotexchemie Brunst & Co. of Hamburg (Rotex), and Rotex’s Geneva affiliate, Formula S.A., for breach of an agreement to sell chemicals to NPC. Asserting that NPC is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Co., which is in turn owned wholly by the Government of Iran, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the United States does not recognize the Khomeini Government of Iran and, hence, that neither Iran nor its instrumentality NPC has standing to sue in U.S. courts. The district court granted the motion, NPC appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held: (1) that a foreign state may have standing to sue in U.S. courts even if the United States does not recognize its government or have diplomatic relations with it; (2) that an unrecognized government will have standing to sue if the U.S. executive branch has evinced a willingness to permit the plaintiff to litigate its claims in U.S. courts; and (3) that the level of intercourse between the United States and Iran, and a Statement of Interest filed in this case by the United States as amicuš curiae, show that the executive branch is willing to permit NPC to litigate its claims in U.S. courts.

Medicaid & Medicare: D.C. Appellate Court Denies Claim for Medicare Reimbursement of GME Cost

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy
Keyword(s):  
Medical Center ◽  
Federal District ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
University Of Pennsylvania ◽  
District Court ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
Summary Judgment

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document