scholarly journals Kant on the Transcendental Deduction of Space and Time: an Essay on the Philosophical Resources of the Transcendental Aesthetic

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Melissa McBay Merritt
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Production Of Knowledge ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Modes Of Representation

Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has focused intensively on the transcendental deduction of the categories – the pivotal chapter of the book that governs our understanding of much that precedes it and just about all that follows it. One simple way to understand the systematic function of the Transcendental Deduction is to appreciate that it provides an account of how the ‘two stems of human knowledge’ (A15/B29) – sensibility and understanding – must relate to one another in the production of knowledge. On Kant's view, these capacities are distinguished by their radically different modes of representation: intuition and concept. Although sensibility and understanding are fundamentally distinct – they ‘cannot exchange their functions’ – they must nevertheless cooperate in the production of knowledge: ‘Only through their unification can cognition arise’ (A51/B75–6). The task of the Deduction is to show how the categories – concepts that stem from the ‘nature of the understanding’ alone – apply necessarily to objects that can only be given in experience, and represented as given through sensible intuition.

scholarly journals Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Thomas Raysmith
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Original Space ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Temporal Representations

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.

Leibniz and the Transcendental Deduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 112-141
Author(s):  
Alison Laywine
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Human Understanding

This chapter explores the significance of Kant’s engagement with Leibniz for the Transcendental Deduction section of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued that the goal of the Transcendental Deduction is largely cosmological—to show that the pure concepts of the understanding relate a priori to objects if it succeeds in showing that human understanding uses these concepts to construct a world out of the appearances that are sensibly given to us in space and time. The notion of “world” that Kant employs in his cosmology has an ancestor, however, in certain views to be found in Leibniz’s philosophy—particularly in his well-known correspondence with Clarke.

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Das Recht in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Reinhard Brandt
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Introductory Note ◽  
Pure Intuition

AbstractRecent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be?

scholarly journals Darwinism as the Missing Link in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Igor K. Kalinin
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Critical Attitude ◽  
Logical Functions

I proceed from the hypothesis that the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of his plan and, accordingly, the implicit reason for the critical attitude to this plan on the part of many contemporary philosophers stem from the fact that he had no theoretical link at his disposal which would offer a more solid scientific grounding for his entire system. I believe that Darwinism is such a link which bolsters the central but ungrounded thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason on the existence of a priori synthetic judgments. The synthesis of Darwinism and critical philosophy dictates, however, a substantial restructuring of the latter since some of its key elements prove to be weak in the light of modern studies and need to be revised or even reversed. The first reversal explored in this article determines the origin of the categories which are now revealed not “from the top down” where Kant sought them, i. e. not in logical functions in accordance with metaphysical deduction and not in self-consciousness as transcendental deduction claims, but “from the bottom up” if one considers things in the evolutionary dimension, i. e. in the instincts. The second reversal shifts the freedom of will which Kant placed in the same ontological basket with things in themselves at “the top,” to another level of the pyramid of ontologies, by changing dualism to pluralism because dualism is too narrow to accommodate all the autonomous components of critical philosophy. Thus spirit and freedom find a new place separate from the sphere of physical nature; the category of adaptation explains how different ontologies can coexist; while the problem of two interpretations of transcendental idealism (two-world vs. two-aspect interpretation) finds a solution through their reconciliation.

scholarly journals TINJAUAN KRITIS TERHADAP EPISTEMOLOGI IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Lailiy Muthmainnah
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Metaphysical Problem ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
Personal Invitation

The background of this article is a metaphysical problem that arose in Immanuel Kant's thought in his Critique of Pure Reason. Through a hermeneutic approach this article aims to analyze the metaphysical problems that arise in Immanuel Kant's epistemology of thought. Based on the research results can be concluded that the unequivocal separation between phenomena and noumena will cause humans will never come to the knowledge of the Transcendent, as well as with moral and aesthetics. This is because such knowledge can only be obtained through my participation as a Subject through the process of continuous existence and more of a personal invitation. In the end it can be concluded that the nature of analog knowledge is the meaning of multidimensional side of human life. This brings consequences to the need for intersubjective dialogue and continual openness. Knowledge is an infinite thing. Human knowledge therefore will never reach the end of the journey but only continuously expanded its horizon.

Kant's Transcendental Deduction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Laywine
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Human Thought

The Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason tries to show that all human thought and knowledge depend on the categories of the understanding and that these categories can apply only to appearances. If it works as an argument, it implies that metaphysics as a science of non-sensible things is impossible. The author of this book argues, however, that the Transcendental Deduction reflects Kant’s long engagement with the branch of special metaphysics called ‘general cosmology’: the doctrine of a world as such. General cosmology was supposed to be a science of non-sensible things. That is how Kant treated it in his early metaphysical writings. But the author argues that Kant later adapted it for the purposes of the Transcendental Deduction. He extracted from it a purely formal characterization of a world, stripped of any commitment to non-sensible things, and repurposed it as a characterization of experience. The author argues that Kant’s formal cosmology of experience is at the heart of the Transcendental Deduction: it informs the aim of the Deduction and the details of its argument—even those that appear remote from anything cosmological.

Proofs of the Existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason and Morning Hours

2020 ◽  
pp. 103-141
Author(s):  
Paul Guyer
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God

This chapter examines Kant’s continued criticism of the classical arguments for the existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason and his critique of his own earlier new argument for God as the ground of all possibility. Kant’s conclusion is that belief in the existence of God must be defended on practical rather than theoretical grounds. In Morning Hours Mendelssohn defended the ontological and cosmological arguments and added a new argument from the incompleteness of human knowledge. Mendelssohn does not accept Kant’s argument for belief in God on moral grounds only but instead adopts a pragmatic position that we have no choice but to rely on the results of the unimpaired use of our own cognitive powers.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document