scholarly journals Appellate Body Report, India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (WT/DS360/AB/R, adopted on 17 November 2008)

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAOLA CONCONI ◽  
Jan Wouters
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Point ◽  
National Treatment ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Border Tax Adjustments ◽  
National Governments

AbstractThis paper critically reviews the main findings of the Appellate Body in the case India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India–Additional Import Duties). This ruling sheds light on the interplay between two core provisions of the GATT, namely Article II GATT (Schedules of Concessions) and III GATT (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation). Linked to this demarcation, the question on the allocation of the burden of proof was a central point of contention in this dispute. The ruling also establishes the principle that WTO Members are allowed to use border tax adjustments, as long as the tax imposed on imports does not exceed the domestic tax. We argue that this principle can help to reconcile the objectives of the WTO with those of national governments.

II.2 LEGAL MAXIMS: SUMMARIES AND EXTRACTS FROM SELECTED CASE LAW

2020 ◽  
pp. 409-436
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Commercial Vehicles ◽  
Member States ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Civil Aircraft

European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia (WT/DS480/R), Panel Report circulated on 25 January 2018, adopted on 28 February 2018 Russia—Anti-Dumping Duties on Light Commercial Vehicles from Germany and Italy (WT/DS479/AB/R), Appellate Body Report circulated on 22 March 2018, adopted on 9 April 2018 European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States (WT/DS487/AB/RW)...

scholarly journals U.S. Refusal to Appoint Members Renders WTO Appellate Body Unable to Hear New Appeals

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.

United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China: Nails in the Coffin of Unfair Dumping Margin Calculation Methodologies

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
EDWIN A. VERMULST
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractThe WTO Appellate Body report United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China is yet another in a long line of disputes involving US Department of Commerce's dumping margin calculation methodologies. The AB ruled against the United States on three important aspects: (1) the use of the Nails test to rationalize the exceptional method in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement so as to justify using the weighted average-to-transaction methodology in dumping margin calculations; (2) the treatment of multiple companies in a non-market economy as a single NME-wide entity; and (3) the USDOC's policy of using adverse facts available for such an entity. Yet, some aspects of the AB's decision – most notably affirming the use of average prices – significantly weaken Article 2.4.2's pattern requirement and potentially open the door to greater use of the exceptional method.

scholarly journals United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (WTO Doc. WT/DS22/R of 15 July 2002): Beating Around (The) Bush

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (S1) ◽  
pp. 12-35
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Trade Commission ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
United States Trade ◽  
Trade Legislation

In this dispute, Canada attacks Section 129(c)(1) of the US trade legislation as a result of the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements [Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), hereinafter “Section 129”] which provides that a new antidumping or countervailing duty determination made by the Department of Commerce (DOC) or the International Trade Commission (ITC) to bring a previous antidumping, countervailing duty or injury determination into conformity with an adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body report applies only to imports that enter the United States on or after the date that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) directs implementation of the new determination.

scholarly journals United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology: the end of Zeroing?

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
EDWIN VERMULST
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Continued Use ◽  
New Perspective

AbstractThis is the eighth Appellate Body Report in which some aspect of zeroing was adjudicated. As in the prior cases, the AB again found the US practice inconsistent with several aspects of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The novelty in this dispute was the EC attempt to broaden the concept of what constitutes an appealable measure. The EC challenged whether a WTO decision regarding zeroing could apply to subsequent proceedings that might modify duty levels and asked the AB to decide whether the United States' continued use of zeroing in the context of a given case was consistent with WTO obligations. The AB stated that in its attempt to bring an effective resolution to the zeroing issue, the EC is entitled to frame the subject of its challenge in such a way as to bring the ongoing use of the zeroing methodology in these cases, under the scrutiny of WTO dispute settlement. The AB then cautiously applied the new perspective to US zeroing practice.

scholarly journals Introduction: International Institutions and Peaceful Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The United Nations

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.

United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico (US–Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico), DS381)

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-525
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Carlson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Final Rule

This compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU concerned measures taken by the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in US–Tuna II (Mexico). In US–Tuna II (Mexico), the DSB found that certain US measures concerning the importation, marketing, and sale of tuna products (taken together, the Original Tuna Measure) were inconsistent with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). The Original Tuna Measure, inter alia, contained conditions under which tuna products could be labelled ‘dolphin safe’. The United States' measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB consisted of an amendment to the Original Tuna Measure (the 2013 Final Rule). The Appellate Body generally referred to the Original Tuna Measure, together with the 2013 Final Rule, as the Amended Tuna Measure. The Amended Tuna Measure was the focus of this compliance proceeding.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

Comparative Environmental Federalism: Subsidiarity and Central Regulation in the United States and China

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiyu Zhao ◽  
Robert Percival
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
National Governments ◽  
National Environmental

AbstractThe proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.

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