Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War by Terrence L. Chapman

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-149
Author(s):  
Thomas Knecht

Why do states go through the trouble of seeking authorization from multilateral institutions to use military force when they are not required to do so? How do states choose the international organization through which to work? Why do citizens sometimes demand a multilateral response to an international crisis, yet at other times seem content when their leaders act unilaterally? Terrence Chapman takes up these questions in his persuasive and important book Securing Approval. The answer, he says, is domestic politics. Using a game-theoretic approach supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, Chapman shows that international organizations (IOs) provide important information to domestic publics. This information can affect public opinion and, by extension, foreign policy. A short review does not do justice to this nuanced and smart book. Nevertheless, I will outline the author's central argument before discussing the book's contribution to the literature. I conclude by raising three issues that might serve as avenues for future research.

1982 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Alan Batlin ◽  
Susan Hinko

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.


2021 ◽  
pp. 127407
Author(s):  
Yuhan Bai ◽  
Kai Fan ◽  
Kuan Zhang ◽  
Xiaochun Cheng ◽  
Hui Li ◽  
...  

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