Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aida Torres Pérez

On 13 February 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court came to a final decision regarding the fate of Mr Stefano Melloni. The story of the case is worthy of attention not only from the perspective of the interaction between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), but also from the standpoint of the conflicting levels of rights' protection in Europe. The story of Melloni can be described in three acts: setup, confrontation, and resolution.First, the setup: in 2011, the Spanish Constitutional Court made its first and (so far) only preliminary reference to the CJEU. The Constitutional Court was faced with a collision between the constitutional right to fair trial of persons convicted in absentia and the obligation under EU law to execute a European arrest warrant (heretofore EAW). This setup generated great anticipation, both because of the protagonists and the type of conflict, since in this case what obstructed one member state from complying with EU law was its higher level of constitutional protection for the right in question.

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-302
Author(s):  
Fisnik Korenica ◽  
Dren Doli

The European Union (eu) accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (echr) has been a hot topic in the European legal discourse in this decade. Ruling on the compliance of the Draft Agreement on eu accession to the echr with the eu Treaties, the Court of Justice of the eu (cjeu) came up with a rather controversial Opinion. It ruled that the Draft Agreement is incompliant with the eu Treaties in several respects. One of the core concerns in Opinion 2/13 relates to the management of horizontal relationship between the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR) and echr, namely Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr. The article examines the Opinion 2/13’s specific concerns on the relationship between Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr from a post-accession perspective. It starts by considering the question of the two 53s’ relationship from the eu-law autonomy viewpoint, indicating the main gaps that may present a danger to the latter. While questioning from a number of perspectives the plausibility of the cjeu’s arguments in relation to the two 53s, the article argues that the Court was both controversial and argued against itself when it drew harshly upon these concerns. The article also presents three options to address the cjeu’s requirements on this issue. The article concludes that the cjeu’s statements on the two 53s will seriously hurt the accession project, while critically limiting the possibility of Member States to provide broader protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-124
Author(s):  
Joana Covelo de Abreu

Under today’s European constitutional demands, effective judicial protection sets the tone concerning potential jurisdictional instruments able to act as constitutionality control mechanisms. Inter-jurisdictionality stands for different and complementary jurisdictional systems living togetherin the same space and it aims to understand how their reflexive interactions can be maintained to promote effective judicial protection. Both the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling act as constitutional controls. The first allows the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to evaluate the incompatibility of national solutions/omissions with EU law but, to meet its full effectiveness, widening legitimate parties needs to be considered as well. Also, validity preliminary rulings act as a constitutional control in proceedings relating to individuals – national judges should be aware of their referring obligations to the CJEU. There are voices amongst European academia that advocate a new constitutional procedure to promote fundamental rights’ protection. However, the main formulas highlighted rely on solutions tested on the national level which can compromise their efficacy. We perceive an inter-jurisdictional paradigm as the proper approach since it will allowthe promotion of effective judicial protection at a constitutional level as a new EU dogmatically thought phenomenon. This is to ensure judicial integration can be perceived as a reality, engaged in pursuing the future of the EU.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Malmberg

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has made it clear that collective action taken by trade unions under certain circumstances might violate the freedom of services and the right of establishment under the Treaty (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU). However, the Court has not addressed the issue of which remedies are to be available against a trade union arranging such an ‘EU-unlawful’ collective action. This question was dealt with by the Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) in its final judgment in December 2009. The article discusses this judgment and presents an alternative understanding of the EU law requirements concerning remedies for EU-unlawful collective actions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1591-1622
Author(s):  
Mihail Vatsov

The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 718-732
Author(s):  
Leandro Mancano

This paper argues that the application of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union (EU) imposes a redefinition of the right to liberty to adjust the latter to the peculiarities of the Union legal order. The article emphasizes the important role that the principle of proportionality in EU law can have for improving the protection of the right to liberty. The two main scenarios of this research are analysed against the different understandings of proportionality: on the one hand, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and the interpretation of the EU Court of Justice; on the other, the three Framework Decisions on transfer of prisoners, probation measures and pre trial measures alternative to detention. The conclusions reveal that, despite the increasing attention paid to proportionality in relation to the right to liberty in mutual recognition, the potential offered by EU law to better protect the right to liberty is still underexploited.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Dimitry Kochenov

Abstract This article scrutinises the logic behind the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy focusing on their implications for the right to family reunification under EU law. Specific attention is devoted to the phenomenon of reverse discrimination in the context of the new jurisdiction test established by the Court, which is based on the severity of the Member States’ interference with EU citizenship rights rather than on a pure cross-border logic. EU citizens unable to establish a link with EU law are often subject to stricter family reunification requirements in comparison to their migrant compatriots and even certain third country nationals. It is argued that this situation is difficult to accept in light of the principles of legal certainty, equality and the protection of fundamental rights. A new balance between EU citizenship and Member States’ regulatory autonomy is established but legislative action is required to solve the outstanding problems.


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