scholarly journals UNIVERSISM AND EXTENSIONS OF V

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLIN ANTOS ◽  
NEIL BARTON ◽  
SY-DAVID FRIEDMAN

Abstract A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are cited as evidence in favor of the latter. This paper informs this debate by developing a way for a Universist to interpret talk that seems to necessitate the addition of sets to V. We argue that, despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We present a method of interpreting extension-talk (V-logic), and show how it captures satisfaction in ‘ideal’ outer models and relates to impredicative class theories. We provide some reasons to regard the technique as philosophically virtuous, and argue that it opens new doors to philosophical and mathematical discussions for the Universist.

10.1142/12456 ◽  
2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cenzer ◽  
Jean Larson ◽  
Christopher Porter ◽  
Jindrich Zapletal

2009 ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Latronico

- Quine's commitment to nominalism has always required set theory to be replaced by an ontologically less dubious tool for the analysis of predication, one that is usually ABSTRACT Rivista di storia della filosofia, n. 1, 2009 mereological in nature, akin to the Calculus of Individuals he and Goodman developed in a seminal paper on nominalism. The problem Quine himself always acknowledged as central in any such replacement arises with the mereological "translation" of numbers. I show here that Quine's proposed translation strategy, even when successful, raises even more serious issues since it requires mereology to supply a substitute for the empty set. After proving the indispensability, given Quine's translation, of such an entity, I demonstrate that an exact mereological replica of the empty set (the "null object") cannot be admitted without engendering contradictions. I conclude by discussing some paraphrases of the usual mereological axioms that prima facie might seem to be compatible with the null object and assessing their implausibility.


10.1142/11324 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cenzer ◽  
Jean Larson ◽  
Christopher Porter ◽  
Jindrich Zapletal

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-301
Author(s):  
John Mayberry

My aim here is to investigate the role of global quantifiers—quantifiers ranging over the entire universe of sets—in the formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The use of such quantifiers in the formulas substituted into axiom schemata introduces, at least prima facie, a strong element of impredicativity into the thapry. The axiom schema of replacement provides an example of this. For each instance of that schema enlarges the very domain over which its own global quantifiers vary. The fundamental question at issue is this: How does the employment of these global quantifiers, and the choice of logical principles governing their use, affect the strengths of the axiom schemata in which they occur?I shall attack this question by comparing three quite different formalizations of the intuitive principles which constitute the Zermelo-Fraenkel system. The first of these, local Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (LZF), is formalized without using global quantifiers. The second, global Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (GZF), is the extension of the local theory obtained by introducing global quantifiers subject to intuitionistic logical laws, and taking the axiom schema of strong collection (Schema XII, §2) as an additional assumption of the theory. The third system is the conventional formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel as a classical, first order theory. The local theory, LZF, is already very strong, indeed strong enough to formalize any naturally occurring mathematical argument. I have argued (in [3]) that it is the natural formalization of naive set theory. My intention, therefore, is to use it as a standard against which to measure the strength of each of the other two systems.


1991 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1496-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig A. Smoryński

George Boolos. The iterative conception of set. The journal of philosophy, vol. 68 (1971), pp. 215–231. - Dana Scott. Axiomatizing set theory. Axiomatic set theory, edited by Thomas J. Jech, Proceedings of symposia in pure mathematics, vol. 13 part 2, American Mathematical Society, Providence1974, pp. 207–214. - W. N. Reinhardt. Remarks on reflection principles, large cardinals, and elementary embeddings. Axiomatic set theory, edited by Thomas J. Jech, Proceedings of symposia in pure mathematics, vol. 13 part 2, American Mathematical Society, Providence1974, pp. 189–205. - W. N. Reinhardt. Set existence principles of Shoenfield, Ackermann, and Powell. Fundament a mathematicae, vol. 84 (1974), pp. 5–34. - Hao Wang. Large sets. Logic, foundations of mathematics, and computahility theory. Part one of the proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada–1975, edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 9, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston1977, pp. 309–333. - Charles Parsons. What is the iterative conception of set?Logic, foundations of mathematics, and computahility theory. Part one of the proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada–1975, edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 9, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston1977, pp. 335–367.

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 544-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 883-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
MIHNEA IANCU ◽  
FLORIAN RABE

Over recent decades there has been a trend towards formalised mathematics, and a number of sophisticated systems have been developed both to support the formalisation process and to verify the results mechanically. However, each tool is based on a specific foundation of mathematics, and formalisations in different systems are not necessarily compatible. Therefore, the integration of these foundations has received growing interest. We contribute to this goal by using LF as a foundational framework in which the mathematical foundations themselves can be formalised and therefore also the relations between them. We represent three of the most important foundations – Isabelle/HOL, Mizar and ZFC set theory – as well as relations between them. The relations are formalised in such a way that the framework permits the extraction of translation functions, which are guaranteed to be well defined and sound. Our work provides the starting point for a systematic study of formalised foundations in order to compare, relate and integrate them.


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