scholarly journals Federal Constitutional Court To Decide Whether to Issue a Temporary Injunction Against Germany's New Lifetime Partnerships Law for Homosexual Couples

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Maurer

On July 18, 2001, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) will issue its ruling in the application for a temporary injunction, brought by the Länder (Federal States) of Bavaria and Saxony, to block the August 1 effective date of the new federalLebenspartnerschaftgesetz(LPartG — Registered Lifetime Partnership Act for Homosexual Relationships). This act has been the subject of considerable controversy including the claims at the heart of the Federal States' challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. This article will: (a) briefly survey the social evolution that has necessitated the regulations in this statute; (b) describe some of the statute's provisions; and (c) end by summarizing some of the sometimes harsh and often very emotional arguments involved in the debate over the LPartG and raised as part of the challenge to the statute's constitutionality in the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court.

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 1961-1982
Author(s):  
Stefanie Egidy

In February 2010, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) issued a ruling on the so-called “Hartz IV legislation.” The ruling dealt with the law on social benefits according to the Second Book of the German Code of Social Law and was based on the “fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum” derived from the declaration of human dignity in Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law in conjunction with Article 20(1), the principle of the social welfare state.


2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.


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