The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>


Author(s):  
Andreas Vosskuhle

Muchos actores están involucrados en la implementación de la idea de comunidad jurídica, entre ellos, los parlamentos nacionales, administraciones y tribunales internos que son responsables de la puesta en práctica del Derecho de la Unión Europea. En este estudio se aborda la labor del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán en el desarrollo de la integración europea considerando diez impulsos centrales. Además, para finalizar, se aportarán algunas reflexiones realistas sobre las limitaciones del derecho en la solución de vicisitudes en el marco de la Unión Europea.Many stakeholders are involved in implementing the idea of legal community, including national parliaments, administrations and courts, which for their part are responsible for the implementation of European law. This study addresses the work of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the development of European integration by considering ten central impulses. In addition, to conclude, some realistic reflections on the limitations of the law in the solution of vicissitudes in the framework of the European Union will be provided.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers

After the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) issuance of the Lisbon decision, a judgment that is generally considered to be a verdict critical of European integration as well as a measure to widen the scope of constitutional review of EU acts, many observers wondered what would happen next. Would the German court finally begin to look for an open conflict with the EU, or would the court's bark once again be worse than its bite? This had already seemed to be the case after the Maastricht decision, the slimmer and legally more coherent predecessor of the Lisbon judgment, after which the court deliberately missed the opportunity to take a shot at the Banana conflict between the EU and the WTO.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (33) ◽  
pp. 315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio López Castillo

En este sucinto comentario es objeto de crítica la primera cuestión prejudicial planteada al TJUE por el Tribunal constitucional federal alemán. Tanto por el (replicante) paralelismo con el que se formulan las preguntas, para dificultar una eventual declaración de inadmisión, como por la extensiva proyección al caso de los tópicos de su jurisprudencia acerca del fundamento y alcance constitucional de la integración europea.In this brief comment is subject to review the first question referred to the ECJ by the German Federal Contitutional Court. Both by (replicative) parallelism with which the questions are asked, to hinder an eventual declaration of inadmissibility, such as extensive projection to the case of the topics of the topics of jurisprudence on the constitutional basis and scope of European integration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document