scholarly journals When Caveats Turn into Locks:Opinion 2/13on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Łazowski ◽  
Ramses A. Wessel

The Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice) decided to strike again. On 18 December 2014, for the second time in history, the Court rejected the European Union's (EU) accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although the judges do not seem to negate the idea as a matter of principle, they made the renegotiation of the Draft Accession Treaty very difficult, to say the least. The message sent by the Court of Justice to the Member States may have surprised some, but for many it was a rather expected development. The Court of Justice has always been a fierce defender and promoter of the autonomy of EU law. For that purpose, the procedure based on Article 218 (11) TFEU has been, among the others, the Court's greatest weapon. Over the years a clear pattern has emerged: Whenever there is a threat to the autonomy and to the Court's exclusive jurisdiction, the judges will not shy away from taking bold decisions going against the will of the Member States. For obvious reasons, theraison d'êtrebehind the Court's decision is kept secret behind the doors of the deliberation rooms at Kirchberg in Luxembourg. Still, it cannot be denied thatOpinion 2/13shows that the Court of Justice will not give up its resistance to the ECHR accession so easily. In 1996, in Opinion 2/94, the Court held that the European Community, as the law stood then, had no competence to accede to ECHR. Now that Article 6(2) TEU provides for an obligation to accede, subject to conditions laid down in Protocol No 8 to the Founding Treaties, the Court has opted for strict interpretation of the latter, which, ultimately turns the caveats laid down therein into locks. It is clear that these caveats turned into locks are something that the judges will hold on to in the future and, by the same token, they will happily pursue interpretation that is very different from what the Member States intended when negotiating the Treaty of Lisbon and the Draft Accession Agreement.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234 EC) gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of EU law. The primary purpose of Article 267 is to ensure that EU law has the same meaning and effect in all the Member States. Where it considers a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable it to give judgment, any court may refer that question to the Court of Justice (the discretion to refer). Where a question of EU law is raised before a national court of last resort, that court must refer it to the Court of Justice (the obligation to refer).


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-176
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the Court of Justice (CJEU). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties. This ensures legal unity.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-131
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lim

On April 30, 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered Opinion 1/17 on the compatibility with European Union (EU) law of the Investment Court System (ICS) under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its member states (CETA). In a momentous decision that is likely to have consequences beyond the CETA, a full court of the CJEU held that the ICS provisions were compatible with EU law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 303-326
Author(s):  
Darren Harvey

Abstract The principle of proportionality has always operated as a means of protecting individuals from excessive uses of public power. When situated alongside the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, proportionality also possesses a federal dimension. In this guise, the principle limits the intensity of EU intervention in order to protect national regulatory autonomy. This federal element of proportionality has featured in recent Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) cases. For example, Member States have challenged European Union (EU) legislation for imposing disproportionate social and economic costs in their particular States. This article considers whether individuals can similarly challenge EU legislation for disproportionately interfering with the regulatory autonomy of the Member States? Having considered this question from the perspective of US federalism, it is argued that individuals are actually articulating “Member States’ rights” in such cases. In so doing, attention is drawn to the question of whose rights and interests are really being articulated and balanced in these disputes.


Author(s):  
Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi

This article critically assesses the feasibility of the recently proposed Investment Court System (ICS) under the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that an ex ante assessment of the ICS by the CJEU would likely result in several incompatibilities between the ICS and EU law, since insufficient safeguards exist guaranteeing that the ICS will not interfere with EU fundamental rights and the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction to deliver binding interpretations of EU law. Moreover, it is not yet certain whether an incompatibility exists with Article 344 TFEU or with substantive EU values. Furthermore, no preliminary reference mechanism is envisaged with a binding ruling of the CJEU and even if such a system were included, it is uncertain whether the ICS could refer a question to the CJEU.


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