Mental pathology and therapeutics (transl. German 2nd ed.).

Author(s):  
W. Griesinger
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Brittan

Both the literary program of Berlioz's Symphonie fantastique and his personal letters dating from the year of the work's composition are suffused with the rhetoric of illness, detailing a maladie morale characterized by melancholy, nervous "exultation," black presentiments, and a malignant idee fixe.. Often mistakenly identified as a term new to the 1830s, the idee fixe has a considerably longer history, dating from the first decade of the nineteenth century when it appeared in the writings of French psychiatrists Etienne Esquirol and Jean-Etienne Georget. Both Esquirol's early writings on insanity and his seminal 1838 treatise identify mental "fixation" as the primary symptom of monomania, the most contentious and well-known mental disease of the period, and one with far-reaching implications not only for medicine but for Romantic literature, philosophy, and autobiography. Examination of the disease's early reception reveals that, well before Berlioz, the psychiatric terminology surrounding monomania had been absorbed into popular discourse. Malignant and humorous idee fixes appeared in cartoons, diaries, and newspaper articles from the 1810s onward, and in fictional works by Hoffmann, Duras, Scribe, Balzac, and others. Here, and in essays published in musical and literary journals of the period, monomania emerged as an increasingly aestheticized malady, and the idee fixe itself as a signal, not of mental debilitation, but of creative absorption and artistic inspiration. When Berlioz figured himself as a monomaniac, both in his personal writing and his symphonic program, he was responding to a discourse of "creative aberration" permeating Romantic literary and medical culture, and to a fashionable fascination with mental pathology. Berlioz was by no means the only artist of the period to diagnose himself with the symptoms of mental fixation. Musset, Janin, and Georges Sand also described themselves in monomaniacal terms in autobiographical "confessions" permeated with references to hallucination, fixation, and emotional pathology. Indeed, we can draw clear parallels between the veiled self-referentiality of the Fantastique and the autobiographical strategies of the Romantic Confession. Berlioz's "self-sounding" resonates with a host of other confessional autobiographies of the period and reflects the collapse between inspiration and insanity, between anatomy and aesthetics, underpinning early-nineteenth-century theories of genius.


1862 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 495-515
Author(s):  
Thomas Laycock

1. The question propounded.—The members of the Association under whose auspices the ‘Journal of Mental Science’ is published, having done me the honour to elect me an honorary member of their body, I think I cannot better express my strong sense of the compliment thus paid to me, than by a cordial co-operation with them in their labours for the advancement of mental science. The subject I have ventured with this object to bring under their notice, is one of the highest importance to their professional success; it is to determine how far a mental science in the true meaning of the term science is possible, and capable of practical application to mental pathology, therapeutics and hygiène, and the needs of society in general. For more than twenty-five years, I have carefully studied mental science in these its practical relations, and have from time to time made my views public. My friend Dr. J. S. Bushnan, has questioned the value and validity of those views in the journal, on two recent occasions', with special reference to two of my latest publications.* It appears from his last communication, (‘Journal of Mental Science,’ October, 1861), that he has come to the conclusion that my systematic views elaborated after so much labour and thought, and carefully applied, not only to the practice, but also to the teaching of both the practice of medicine in general, and of psychiatry in particular are, “in no sense practical.” This, to me, startling conclusion, has led me to examine into the mode by which my friend and critic came by the notion, and I find that either he or I must be under a singular misapprehension, both as to what is scientific and practical, and as to how it may be attained. I know of no other method for testing where the error lies, than a comparison of Dr. Bushnan's principles and method with mine, in reference to the objects for which the journal is established. Now Dr. Bushnan states his doctrine very explicitly at the outset.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Darshani Jai Kumareswaran

<p>The primary aim of this thesis was to understand some of the factors that make an individual more likely to ascribe to conspiracy theories. Ascription to conspiracy theories was conceptualised dimensionally along a continuum labelled Conspiracy Theory Affinity (CTA). Strong CTA reflects both a high level of belief in conspiracy theories and a tendency to create conspiracy theories (conspiracy theorising). To gauge this, I measured level of conspiracy belief, conspiracy pattern perception (conspiracy theory creation), as well as various forms of psychopathology. The findings of the psychopathology study (study 4) suggested that high conspiracy theory affinity individuals are more likely to present with high levels of paranoia, delusion, general mental pathology, as well as a high level and range of schizotypal traits. The conspiracy theory literature has also suggested that a lack of control is germane to development and maintenance of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The literature also suggests that one compensatory strategy commonly used to re-establish a semblance of control is illusory pattern perception. Illusory pattern perception or Apophenia, is when unrelated stimuli (either visual or situational) are perceived to be connected in some meaningful way. Therefore, I also sought to establish if a direct link between illusory pattern perception and CTA actually exists. In studies 1 and 2 I experimentally induced a sense of low control using methods that have proven effective in previous research. The findings of these studies suggested that a lack of control does not necessarily reflect that a person is more likely to engage in conspiracy pattern perception. However, the findings also suggested that when a low level of control is felt by an individual who also has a magical thinking style, they are more likely to demonstrate illusory visual pattern perception. Limitations of these studies and therefore their potential influence on interpretations of the findings were also considered. Another major research aim of this thesis was to elucidate how society perceives conspiracy theorists and how those with strong CTA perceive the label of conspiracy theorist. The findings of two studies (studies 3b and 5) revealed that the majority of respondents considered conspiracy theorists to be characteristically similar to those with current mental health concerns and also convicted criminals, and dissimilar to targets with resolved mental health issues and no current mental health issues (e.g. the average man). In contrast however, those with strong CTA rated the target Conspiracy Theorist significantly more favourably than those with low CTA. Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings across these 5 studies are discussed, and methodological limitations are also acknowledged.</p>


1921 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 539-542
Author(s):  
Leta S. Hollingworth
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Bedford ◽  
Ian J. Deary
Keyword(s):  

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