Supplemental Material for Regret in Experience-Based Decisions: The Effects of Expected Value Differences and Mixed Gains and Losses

Decision ◽  
2021 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Hayes ◽  
Douglas Wedell

Previous research on experience-based decisions with full feedback supports the idea that people tend to prefer options that minimize the probability of regret. The current study explored whether this preference is modulated by differences in expected value (EV) and the presence or absence of occasional losses. Participants (n = 52) completed an online experiment that involved repeated choices between a safer and a riskier option while receiving full feedback. The riskier option yielded a better outcome on 80% of draws so that choosing it minimized the probability of regret. Preference for the riskier, regret-minimizing option was high when it had the same EV as the safer option and all outcomes were gains, but it decreased when the safer option had a higher EV and when both options included occasional losses. Outcome ratings that were obtained on 50% of trials showed large effects of regret and rejoicing, confirming that participants were sensitive to relative comparisons between obtained and forgone outcomes. Reinforcement-learning modeling indicated that the effects of unequal EVs and mixed outcomes could be accounted for by assuming combined encoding of absolute and relative outcomes and unequal weighting of gains and losses. Overall, these results demonstrate that the impact of regret can be modulated by structural features of the choice environment.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. e0257011
Author(s):  
Lieke L. F. van Lieshout ◽  
Iris J. Traast ◽  
Floris P. de Lange ◽  
Roshan Cools

Curiosity is pervasive in our everyday lives, but we know little about the factors that contribute to this drive. In the current study, we assessed whether curiosity about uncertain outcomes is modulated by the valence of the information, i.e. whether the information is good or bad news. Using a lottery task in which outcome uncertainty, expected value and outcome valence (gain versus loss) were manipulated independently, we found that curiosity is overall higher for gains compared with losses and that curiosity increased with increasing outcome uncertainty for both gains and losses. These effects of uncertainty and valence did not interact, indicating that the motivation to reduce uncertainty and the motivation to maximize positive information represent separate, independent drives.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lieke van Lieshout ◽  
Iris Traast ◽  
Floris de Lange ◽  
Roshan Cools

Curiosity is pervasive in our everyday lives, but little is known about its underlying mechanisms. In the current study, we assessed whether curiosity about uncertain outcomes is modulated by the valence of the information, i.e. whether the information is good or bad news. Using a lottery task in which outcome uncertainty, expected value and outcome valence (gain versus loss) were manipulated independently, we found that curiosity is overall higher for gains compared with losses. Surprisingly, curiosity increased with increasing outcome uncertainty for both gains and losses, contradicting models that posit that humans seek positive and avoid negative information. Curiosity thus follows from multiple drives, including a drive to improve our world model, as well as, separately, a drive to maximize positive information.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eldad Yechiam ◽  
Taher Abofol ◽  
Thorsten Pachur

2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Schlottmann ◽  
Jane Tring

Three experiments considered how the positive or negative framing of decisions affects children’s EV (expected value) judgements and choices. In Experiment 1, 6- and 9-year-olds chose between a sure gain and a gamble or between a sure loss and a gamble, all with the same EV. Children preferred the sure thing more in the positive than negative frame, as also appears for adults. In Experiment 2, both frames involved potential losses. In their judgements, 6- and 9-year-olds used the normative multiplication rule for integrating risk and amount at risk, with minor frame differences, but when choosing between the same options, they were risk-averse in the save, risk-seeking in the loss frame. In Experiment 3, 5-year-olds used multiplication for saves, with an irregular pattern for losses. Overall, children’s judgements conform closely to normativity. At the same time, children’s choices, like adults’, show non-normative framing effects. This décalage may reflect the involvement of more intuitive processes in judgement than choice.


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