Commitment and the Implicit Activation of Relational Thinking Under Threat

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Burton
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Raymond ◽  
Roope Kaaronen ◽  
Matteo Giusti ◽  
Noah Linder ◽  
Stephan Barthel

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-98
Author(s):  
Roberta Ramos Marques ◽  
◽  
Liana Gesteira Costa ◽  

Abstract: This paper discusses the creative process of the street performance Motim (Mutiny) (2015) from the perspective of laughter as a bio-potent performative action. We discuss how the relational thinking emerged within the framework of a process dramaturgy (Kerkhove, 1997), conceptualizing creative thinking as a network (Salles, 2006). The collaborative creative process of Motim started with three ways of approaching the act of laughing: physicality, memory and contagion. By focusing on contagion, we will discuss how relational thinking was installed in the creative process of Motim and was powered by the investigative aspect of laughter as contagion.


Relational Thinking Styles is traced to Peirce’s phenomenology, his logic and concept of abduction. A process similar to Peirce’s descriptions of this phenomenological sort of proto-abduction is demonstrated and observed by means of the Davis Non-Verbal Assessment of inferencing styles. Noticing, or failing to notice, similarities and differences among things resides at the core of reasoning; all similarities and differences are discerned based upon the qualities of things, for there is no possibility of discernment without qualities to discern among. A mind cannot think about what it does not notice or has not previously noticed. Individuals become aware of similarities between things and ideas order and organize qualities, or properties, which distinguish one thing from another. Peirce’s practice of phenomenology as a whole comprises the qualitative core of reasoning. Since these three universal categories underlie the structure of Peirce’s philosophy as a whole, they underlie his logic as well. In particular, these phenomenological categories are essential for understanding his concept of abduction and, therefore, Peirce’s Logic.


2020 ◽  
pp. 291-291
Author(s):  
Michael Della Rocca

In making the Parmenidean Ascent, one transcends metaphysical distinctions and is freed from the illusions of relational thinking. This freedom from the burden of attempting to make our words and sentences match or correspond to an independent reality and to invest our thoughts with metaphysical significance promises to enable us finally to see the world aright as Wittgenstein would put it. This chapter—which is as far as possible freed from any distinctions— is an imperfect attempt to exhibit the spirit of play that comes with the freedom from relational metaphysical explanation.


Author(s):  
Risto Saarinen

Luther believes that a Christian needs to constitute his identity “outside of himself” (extra se). This is because the justification of sinners and our spiritual existence are based on an external grounding, not on our own properties or contributions. In such relationality, Christians are heteronomous beings. Their actions, desires, and even bodily properties are attributed to them from outside as gift. This relationality is strongly present in Luther’s texts. While Luther employs a rich variety of relational phrases, for instance, “before God” (coram Deo) and “for me” (pro me), he does not employ the concept of relation frequently. When this concept is used, it typically points to a situation in which the person must renounce his old, carnal, and natural properties and seek help from God. The new, spiritual way of life consists of the reception of God’s gifts that are external to oneself. This view is based in monastic theology. Luther is not content with the monastic renunciation of one’s own properties. He employs mystical terminology without, however, aiming at dissolving the human subject in the manner of Meister Eckhart. Instead, Luther thinks that there is a new path of constituting the Christian person as something that is “external to oneself.” While this view differs from medieval mysticism, it can also be interpreted as a certain “intensification” of its aims. Proceeding on this path, the Christian no longer considers his hands, his feet, his choices, his actions as his own contribution. They are rather something that is attributed to him, a passive attachment. Luther’s view of relationality helps to understand what he means by the Christian’s first-person involvement in phrases like “my faith” and “for my sake.” He does not have the post-Enlightenment sense of subjectivity in the manner of Pietism or other individualist variants of modern Christianity. On the other hand, the ideas of passive attachment and the attribution of gift-like properties to a believer enable a robust first-person involvement in faith. Within this framework of relational passivity, faith and its acts are not contributions in the sense of human works. At the same time, the Christian has the ability to receive good gifts and participate in them. There are certain parallels with the Stoic view of oikeiosis, the primary social attachment taught by Cicero and many Christian thinkers. Luther is also well aware of the Augustinian view of divine persons as relations. For this reason, he can also understand in which sense relations can be primary “things” in theology. Sometimes the interpreters of Luther have extended the issue of relationality to cover all kinds of themes that assume a communicative interplay of different parties. Such extension can often highlight adequately the biblical background of an idea that is narrative rather than philosophical.


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