Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics

This Element looks at the problem of inter-translation between mathematical realism and anti-realism and argues that so far as realism is inter-translatable with anti-realism, there is a burden on the realist to show how her posited reality differs from that of the anti-realist. It also argues that an effective defence of just such a difference needs a commitment to the independence of mathematical reality, which in turn involves a commitment to the ontological access problem – the problem of how knowable mathematical truths are identifiable with a reality independent of us as knowers. Specifically, if the only access problem acknowledged is the epistemological problem – i.e. the problem of how we come to know mathematical truths – then nothing is gained by the realist notion of an independent reality and in effect, nothing distinguishes realism from anti-realism in mathematics.

Metaphor, Embodied Realism, and Sacramental Truth

This chapter and the next provide an introduction to the field of cognitive linguistics. This chapter focuses on core concepts including conceptual metaphor, metonymy, polysemy, and prototype theory (conceptual blending is explored in Chapter 3). Based on this overview, the author argues that language “means” not through referential correspondence to objective, observer-independent reality but by prompting for embodied simulation on the part of hearers and readers. Language, then, is true insofar as these simulations are apt to reality as experienced by embodied human beings. The chapter proposes that this epistemological perspective of “embodied realism” is congruent with the critical realism endorsed by many recent theologians and with a sacramental worldview in which the material world can be the arena for God’s self-communication.

The Marginal Reality of Humor

The relevance of the work is due to the presence of a contradiction between the prevalence of humor, its ubiquity and ubiquity in social reality and its rather weak research as a phenomenon of this social reality. The main line of existing research on the nature of humor is connected with the study of it as a statement with a special (contradictory) logic. The purpose of this article is to study the nature of humor not so much within the framework of a separate statement with a special logic but as a phenomenon that constructs social reality, as well as the place of humorous reality among other types of social reality. The analysis is carried out on the basis of the constructivist approach, by the method of reconstruction of the humorous text. As a result of the study, the hypothesis of the existence of humor as a certain layer between referential realities (Zh. Derrida) is supplemented by the idea of constructing in a humorous utterance on the basis of these referential realities a special independent reality of humor, which remains marginal within the framework of the discourse in which referential realities are realized. Humor destroys the contingent logic of discourse in a certain semantic field, comparing previously disparate realities. The construction of humorous reality within the semantic field of professional knowledge performs other functions than outside of it (for example, in everyday knowledge). The absence or limitation of jokes about the knowledge sacred to the system, which belongs to the nuclear part of the corresponding discourse that constructs the system, is a protective mechanism for this system, which stabilizes society. The results of the study are a continuation of the development of the constructivist approach in ontology and social philosophy and can serve as a basis for studying the ways of constructing realities in society

Matter and Sense in Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: Against the ‘Ism’ in Speculative Realism

I argue against the use of general ‘ism’ terms such as ‘speculative realism’ and ‘correlationism’ by Harman. This use is contrasted with more nuanced readings of philosophers, referring to Bryant and DeLanda’s more subtle versions of materialism that do not fit the general label. Instead of general categories I defend Deleuze’s use of the concept of problem as studied by Bell. This argument is then developed through a close reading of Logic of Sense, against Harman’s denial of the reality of relations and processes. I demonstrate that Deleuze is not a correlationist as defined by Harman, by following Sauvagnargues, Smith and Beistegui on the concepts of event and simulacrum in Logic of Sense. I then consider Deleuze’s study of language and his argument that designation, signification and manifestation rely on the concept of sense. This argument leads to a position which is neither idealism, nor materialism, because the differential processes at work in sense cannot be reduced to matter or to the subject, working instead between them and denying their independent reality.

The Implantation Argument: Simulation Theory is Proof that God Exists

I introduce the implantation argument, a new argument for the existence of God. Spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind, composing an external physical reality, cannot be composed of either atomlessness (infinite divisibility, atomless gunk), or of Democritean atoms (extended simples), and therefore the inner experience of an external reality containing spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind does not represent the external reality (inner mind does not represent external, mind-independent, reality), the mind is a mere cinematic-like mindscreen (a mindscreen simulation), implanted into the mind by a creator-God. It will be shown that only a creator-God can be the implanting creator of the mindscreen simulation (the creator of reality), and other simulation theories, such as Bostrom’s famous account, that do not involve a creator-God as the mindscreen simulation creator, involve a reification fallacy.

Realism and symbolic systems in the practice of scientific psychology

Arocha offers a compelling take on the shortfalls associated with the predominant use of inferential statistics in behavioural research. We will show how the author draws upon an idealized view of the mature sciences. Rather than chasing subject-independent reality, we propose that a more fruitful approach to studying behavior lies in considering the reality of sociocommunally constituted human experience. Recognizing the interindividual, symbolic nature of human reality makes way for the discipline to address irreducible human-symbolic ontologies. Further, utilizing multiple symbolic systems enables critique essential for progress in science.

Guidelines for Conducting a Critical Realist Case Study

The case study is a widely used methodology among qualitative researchers irrespective of their philosophical orientation. While positivist and interpretive philosophies are the two most popular research philosophies across diverse research fields, critical realism offers a third alternative. Critical realism is a research philosophy that assumes the existence of an independent reality but also accepts that there may be varied interpretations of it due to a difference in context. Mechanisms are the theoretical building blocks of critical realism and presence, absence, or interaction of certain mechanisms may result in the presence or absence of certain events. However, limited guidelines are available on conducting a critical realist case study. This paper fills this gap by providing some practical guidelines on how a CR-based case study may be planned and executed. Practical guidelines are offered for framing the research question, data collection, writing a narrative, coding, and explanation building while following a critical realist philosophy.

Implicatures and Naturalness

Pragmatics postulates a rich typology of implicatures to explain how true assertions can nevertheless be misleading. This typology has been mainly defended on the basis of a priori considerations. We consider the question of whether the typology corresponds to an independent reality, specifically whether the various types of implicatures constitute natural concepts. To answer this question, we rely on the conceptual spaces framework, which represents concepts geometrically, and which provides a formally precise criterion for naturalness. Using data from a previous study, a space for the representation of implicatures is constructed. Examination of the properties of various types of implicatures as represented in that space then gives some reason to believe that most or even all types of implicatures do correspond to natural concepts.

Guidelines for Conducting a Critical Realist Case Study

The case study is a widely used methodology among qualitative researchers irrespective of their philosophical orientation. While positivist and interpretive philosophies are the two most popular research philosophies across diverse research fields, critical realism offers a third alternative. Critical realism is a research philosophy that assumes the existence of an independent reality but also accepts that there may be varied interpretations of it due to a difference in context. Mechanisms are the theoretical building blocks of critical realism, and presence, absence, or interaction of certain mechanisms may result in the presence or absence of certain events. However, limited guidelines are available on conducting a critical realist case study. This chapter fills this gap by providing some practical guidelines on how a CR-based case study may be planned and executed. Practical guidelines are offered for framing the research question, data collection, writing a narrative, coding, and explanation building aligned with a critical realist philosophy.

Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt: A Response to George Berkeley in Twentieth-Century Danish Philosophy

Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a challenge to epistemologists. Do we experience a mind-independent reality, even though we do it with the help of senses bound to give us subjective experiences? Berkeley – or a straw man by that name (i.e. Berkeley without God) – played an important part as sparring partner for an influential development of Danish theoretical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. The protagonists here are Peter Zinkernagel (1921–2003) and David Favrholdt (1931–2012). Zinkernagel held an extraordinary appointment as research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Favrholdt was the founding father of the Philosophical Institute at Odense University (today: University of Southern Denmark). This essay focuses on the constructive moments in Zinkernagel’s alternative to immaterialism, being based on a distinction between perception and action, and on Favrholdt’s development of a reconstruction of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.