The Value of Victory - Neural Mechanisms of the Winner's Curse

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter van den Bos ◽  
Arjun Talwar ◽  
Samuel McClure
Keyword(s):  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

The Real Winner's Curse

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Pablo Querubin ◽  
Nelson A. Ruiz ◽  
Juan F. Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Winner’S Curse

Be a Winner Not a Loser: Experimental Evidence of Winner's curse

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 303-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clare Chua ◽  
Peter Luk
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Anomalies: The Winner's Curse

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Field Studies ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Common Phenomenon ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Winning Bidder ◽  
Common Value Auction ◽  
Very High

Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very high that the following results will be obtained: (1) the average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you will have money for lunch, and your students will have learned first-hand about the “winner's curse.” The winner's curse cannot occur if all the bidders are rational, so evidence of a winner's curse in market settings would constitute an anomaly. However, acting rationally in a common value auction can be difficult. Solving for the optimal bid is not trivial. Thus, it is an empirical question whether bidders in various contexts get it right or are cursed. I will present some evidence, both from experimental and field studies, suggesting that the winner's curse may be a common phenomenon.

Veconlab Classroom Clicker Games: The Wisdom of Crowds and the Winner's Curse

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
AJ Allen Bostian ◽  
Charles A. Holt
Keyword(s):  
Wisdom Of Crowds ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
The Wisdom Of Crowds

Strategic Nondisclosure in Takeovers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Tingjun Liu ◽  
Ran Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Cautionary Note ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Target Value ◽  
Hard Information ◽  
Withholding Information ◽  
Acquisition Price

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder’s information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner’s curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival’s participation. In turn, an endogenous dis- closure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard  unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders’ payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare but increasing shareholders’ payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.

Prices and the Winner's Curse

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Klemperer ◽  
Jeremy Bulow
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

scholarly journals Bets and Bids: Favorite-Longshot Bias and Winner's Curse

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorgen G. de Wit ◽  
Jan J.M. Potters
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse
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