Conditional probability computation in conditional reasoning

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Best
Author(s):  
David Over

There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language and of conditional reasoning. Dorothy Edgington has had a major impact on this new paradigm, through her views on inference from uncertain premises, the relation between the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if p then q), and the conditional probability, P(q|p), and the use of the Ramsey test to evaluate conditionals. Accounts are given in this chapter of the psychological experiments in the new paradigm that confirm empirical hypotheses inspired by her work and other philosophical sources.


Author(s):  
Rani Lill Anjum ◽  
Stephen Mumford

When dealing with probability in causal claims, conditional reasoning seems unavoidable since we will want to know the probability of an effect, if the cause occurs. Conditional probability is typically defined in terms of the ratio of the unconditional probabilities of the elements. But when it comes to cause and effect, there are good reasons to think that this does not hold and that the conditional probability is primitive. It can be shown that a number of problematic but valid inferences from classical logic reproduce in the calculation of conditional probability if the ratio analysis is employed. The primitivist response is to take the conditional connection as unanalysable.


Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Joseph D. Cautilli ◽  
Donald A. Hantula

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Markovits ◽  
Robert Vachon

2015 ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Miguel López Astorga

RESUMENEn este trabajo, analizamos un experimento sobre el razonamiento condicional de Staller, Sloman y Ben-Zeev (2000). En dicho experimento, los sujetos parecen manifestar un comportamiento contrario a las prescripciones de la lógica formal. Nosotros lo revisamosy descubrimos todas las variables que es preciso atender en los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje, variables que no siempre son consideradas por los docentes.Palabras clave: condicional, conocimiento general, inferencia, procesamiento de la información, representación mental.DO WE REASON ACCORDING TO OUR GENERALKNOWLEDGE? A STUDY ABOUT INTERACTIONSBETWEEN INFORMATION PROCESSING AND LOGICALINFERENCEABSTRACTIn this paper, I analyze an experiment about conditional reasoning presented by Staller,Sloman and Ben-Zeev (2000). In that experiment, the subjects’ behavior seems contradictory to prescriptions of formal logic. I check it and I discover all the variables that we need to deal with them in teaching and learning processes, despite that such variables are notalways checked by the teachers.Keywords: conditional, general knowledge, inference, information processing, mentalrepresentation.


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