Radical skepticism and rational error

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Waterman
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Dominik Perler

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This chapter argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism, and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism, and naturalism. This crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The chapter examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 111-130
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann

This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.


2021 ◽  
pp. 151-170
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

This chapter employs the intuitionist particularist approach laid out in Chapters Six and Seven to develop an ecumenical noninferential anti-skeptic’s response to the underdetermination arguments (considered earlier in the book) for radical skepticism about perception, memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. The sense in which this response is ecumenical is that it can easily be endorsed by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite the ecumenical nature of this anti-skeptical response to radical skepticism, one lesson of the book so far is that there is a sense in which “externalism” of a certain kind (acceptable to both internalists and externalists alike) wins the day.


2021 ◽  
pp. 131-150
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann

This chapter elucidates and defends intuitionist particularism, which is introduced in Chapter Six. Sections 1 and 2 focus on seemings, elucidating the nature of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings and defending the reliance of intuitionist particularism on seemings. These sections present a detailed account of what seemings are and respond to various objections to seemings playing a role in philosophical work. Sections 3 and 4 elucidate the goal of the intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism (noting that it is not intended to convert the skeptic) and defend the respectability of that commonsense response against the charges that it fails to engage the skeptic or to take radical skepticism seriously.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. isbn 978-0-691-16723-7.


1980 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 293-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Vansina

Interest in the question of Bantu expansion rose dramatically in the 1950s as historians, archeologists, and anthropologists all joined in the fray. This reflected both the rise of Africa in world affairs and the expansion of research in general. The scholars involved were typically a new breed of professionals, and as such more dependent than their predecessors on universities or research institutions. The School of Oriental and African Studies in London achieved overwhelming dominance from about 1950 until the late 1960s, so that opinions held by its staff found the widest audience. The new scholars also were, for the most part, anti-racist, sympathetic to African nationalisms, and of liberal or socialist persuasion. They tended to reject the notion of “conquest,” believing in gradual change rather than abrupt cataclysmic mutation, perhaps because they were repelled by their recent experiences during the war. As had happened earlier, these extraneous circumstances left a deep imprint on the speculations that were now proposed. Early in this period a new paradigm almost achieved consensus, but after 1968 this fell apart and during the last decade two new trends have appeared: the single-minded quest for a new paradigm and the search for better understanding through the study of analogous processes, coupled with a more radical skepticism.Murdock


2016 ◽  
Vol 174 (5) ◽  
pp. 1299-1321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Echeverri
Keyword(s):  

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