How to Make Content out of Form: Towards a Hegelian-Saussurean Theory of Non-Linear Structures of Possibility

In this article I argue that Hegel and Saussure both discovered a new mode of theorization that I propose to call ‘structural explication’. This is distinct from the generally dominant ‘linear’ mode of theorization—i.e., causal and quasi-causal explanations. I also argue that the standard criticisms usually directed against Hegel and Saussure stem from a failure to appreciate the nature of structural explication. For example, both Hegel and Saussure argue that—in some deep sense—form can generate content. But this must be comprehended in a strictly non-linear way. A linear interpretation of such arguments will lead to absurdities. I propose to call such deep generative structures (with a nod to Kant) the ‘necessary structures of possibility’. By comparing Hegel's thoughts on the science of a philosophical logic and Saussure's thoughts on the science of a general linguistics it is possible to discern a deep ‘scientific’ affinity. Furthermore, I argue that the structural level cannot be accounted for in any linear way. On the contrary, the linear explanation is fundamentally dependent on a structural explication of the genesis of the basic terms it assumes as ‘given’. A possible reason for the pervasiveness of the linear explanation (besides, perhaps, the success of causality-oriented natural sciences) is that discursive language is linear and our lived experience in time is linear. Thus, a structural explication will inherently appear less intuitive, and maybe also less ‘satisfying’, than a linear explanation. Finally, I also bring the distinction between the linear and the structural to bear on Robert Brandom's normative pragmatist reading of Hegel's ‘semantic holism’.

MODERATE HOLISM: ANSWERING TO CRITICISM AND EXPLAINING LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA

In this paper I present a version of meaning holism proposed by Henry Jackman (1999a, 1999b, 2005 and 2015) entitled "moderate holism". I will argue that this moderate version of holism, in addition to responding to much of the criticism attributed to traditional semantic holism (such as translation, disagreement, change of mind and communication), is also extremely useful to explain the occurrence of several, such as vagueness and polysemy. HOLISMO SEMÂNTICO MODERADO E FENÔMENOS LINGUÍSTICOS Neste artigo tenho o objetivo de apresentar uma versão do holismo semântico tradicional proposta por Henry Jackman (1999a, 1999b, 2005 e 2015) intitulada “holismo semântico moderado”. Defenderei que esta versão moderada do holismo, além de responder grande parte das críticas atribuídas ao holismo semântico tradicional (como a tradução, o desacordo, a mudança de opinião e comunicação), também se faz extremamente útil para explicar a ocorrência de diversos fenômenos linguísticos, como, por exemplo: a vagueza e a polissemia.

Meaning and verification

The verifiability theory of meaning says that meaning is evidence. It is anticipated in, for example, Hume’s empiricist doctrine of impressions and ideas, but it emerges into full notoriety in twentieth-century logical positivism. The positivists used the theory in a critique of metaphysics to show that the problems of philosophy, such as the problem of the external world and the problem of other minds, are not real problems at all but only pseudoproblems. Their publicists used the doctrine to argue that religion, ethics and fiction are meaningless, which is how verificationism became notorious among the general public. Seminal criticism of verification from around 1950 argues that no division between sense and nonsense coincides tidily with a division between science and metaphysics, as the positivists had claimed. Quine later developed verificationism into a sort of semantic holism in which metaphysics is continuous with science. In contrast, Dummett argues from a reading of Wittgenstein’s claim that meaning is use to a rejection of any sort of truth surpassing the possibility of knowledge, and thence to a defence of intuitionistic logic. But the claim that all truths can be known yields in an otherwise innocuous setting the preposterous consequence that all truths actually are known. There are ways to tinker with the setting so as to avoid this consequence, but it is best to conclude by reductio that some truths cannot be known and that verificationism is false. That in turn seems to show that the prospects for an empiricist theory of meaning are dim, which might well shake a complacent confidence in meaning.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT LEGISLATION APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR A CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

As a consequence of section 39 of the Constitution literal interpretation, which prevailed under the previous legal and constitutional dispensation, has been replaced by a purposive/value-based method and theory of interpretation. A new and creative method of legal reasoning has emerged that facilitates social justice. This involves a deontic element, which incorporates ethical and moral evaluation. A far more holistic approach is now adopted, and legal interpretation is now applied in a manner that is allied to the discipline of hermeneutics as found in literature and philosophy. Interpretation has become holistic in this process. The theory of holism has a South African connection since the term has its genesis in Smuts’s book, Holism and Evolution, first published in 1926. Semantic holism is a doctrine in the philosophy of language to the “effect that a certain part of language can only be understood through its relations to a larger segment of language, possibly the entire language”.This note is intended to show how the application of the presumption relating to retrospectivity reflects the new approach, which is creative and supersedes the old mechanical approach that had its origin in the sovereignty of parliament that gave rise to literal or textual interpretation. There has been a paradigmatic shift in the process of interpretation of statutes in South Africa, from a methodology that tended to be rule-bound to one that requires that the use of rules or canons must give expression to the cardinal values found in the Constitution and its Bill of Rights. This requires a semantic holism as explained above. This should emerge from a deontic method of legal reasoning, which must complement deductive and inductive reasoning, by taking into account principles of morality and the values found in the Constitution as explained by Devenish. Such interpretation was in exceptional cases used before the advent of the new constitutional dispensation such as that found in the meritorious majority judgment of Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council (1920 AD 530). Such holistic interpretation is now the rule and not merely an exception.

Spinoza on Skepticism

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This chapter argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism, and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism, and naturalism. This crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The chapter examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies.