Does the cohesion–outcome relationship change over time? A dynamic model of change in group psychotherapy.

In this paper, I undertake a novel approach to uncover the forecasting interconnections in the international housing markets. Using a dynamic model averaging framework that allows both the coefficients and the entire forecasting model to dynamically change over time, I uncover the intertwined forecasting relationships in 23 leading international housing markets. The evidence suggests significant forecasting interconnections in these markets. However, no country holds a constant forecasting advantage, including the United States and the United Kingdom, although the U.S. housing market's predictive power has increased over time. Evidence also suggests that allowing the forecasting model to change is more important than allowing the coefficients to change over time.

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Soybean Futures Price Forecasting Using Dynamic Model Averaging: Do the Predictors Change over Time?

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade ◽

10.1080/1540496x.2019.1618265 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 1-17

Author(s):

Tao Xiong ◽

Zhongyi Hu

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Model ◽

Model Averaging ◽

Price Forecasting ◽

Change Over Time ◽

Futures Price ◽

Dynamic Model Averaging ◽

Over Time

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Equilibria in a dynamic model of two firms coordination with non-fixed prices

Mathematical Game Theory and Applications ◽

10.17076/mgta_2021_3_39 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (3) ◽

pp. 28-57

Author(s):

Андрей Павлович Парфенов ◽

Andrey Parfyonov

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Model ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Change Over Time ◽

Market Prices ◽

Fixed Prices ◽

Over Time

Model of 2 companies' interaction is considered. Companies exchange two kinds of goods with each other. These goods also can be selled on the market. Prices of goods change over time. Interation is modelled by positional game which is similar to Rosental's Centipede game. Conditions for a contract beetween companies are found. For these conditions, companies can't violate a contract because it is unprofitable for them. Such conditions are modelled by Nash equilibriua in a positional game. We found that sufficient conditions for contract: it renews each 2 points of time; each company pays rather big fine if it refused to transfer good to another company.

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How Do “Resource Bundles” Develop and Change in New Ventures? A Dynamic Model and Longitudinal Exploration

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice ◽

10.1177/104225870102500303 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 25 (3) ◽

pp. 37-58 ◽

Cited By ~ 147

Author(s):

Benyamin M. Bergmann Lichtenstein ◽

Candida G. Brush

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Model ◽

New Ventures ◽

New Venture ◽

Entrepreneurial Firms ◽

Short Term ◽

Change Over Time ◽

Performance Results ◽

Term Performance ◽

Over Time

According to recent studies applying Resource-Based Theory [RBT] to entrepreneurial firms (e.g. Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Brush & Greene, 1996), in the early stages of new venture development it is the identification and acquisition of resources—rather than deployment or allocation activities—that is crucial for the firm's long-term success (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985). This study explores that relationship longitudinally, tracking salient resources in three rapidly growing new ventures, and analyzing how these resources change over time. Our findings identify the most common types of salient resources, the primary types of changes in resource and resource bundles, and a pattern linking the type of change with short-term performance results in each firm.

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