scholarly journals Evolutionary Dynamics of the Transitions across the Nash equilibria of a Tacit Coordination Game

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 109-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmina Arifovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Tacit Coordination

scholarly journals Evolutionary Network Games: Equilibria from Imitation and Best Response Dynamics

Complexity ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Cimini
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Strategic Substitutes ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Best Response

We consider games of strategic substitutes and complements on networks and introduce two evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria. Within mean field, we find that for the best-shot game, taken as a representative example of strategic substitutes, replicator-like dynamics does not lead to Nash equilibria, whereas it leads to a unique equilibrium for complements, represented by a coordination game. On the other hand, when the dynamics becomes more cognitively demanding, predictions are always Nash equilibria: for the best-shot game we find a reduced set of equilibria with a definite value of the fraction of contributors, whereas, for the coordination game, symmetric equilibria arise only for low or high initial fractions of cooperators. We further extend our study by considering complex topologies through heterogeneous mean field and show that the nature of the selected equilibria does not change for the best-shot game. However, for coordination games, we reveal an important difference: on infinitely large scale-free networks, cooperative equilibria arise for any value of the incentive to cooperate. Our analytical results are confirmed by numerical simulations and open the question of whether there can be dynamics that consistently leads to stringent equilibria refinements for both classes of games.

scholarly journals Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Mauleon ◽  
Simon Schopohl ◽  
Akylai Taalaibekova ◽  
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Connected Network ◽  
Ex Ante

AbstractWe study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both projects) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are increasing in the number of neighbors who choose the same project. In addition, players are either farsighted or myopic. Farsighted players anticipate the reactions of others while myopic players do not. We show that, when all players are farsighted, full coordination among the moderate players is reached except if there are stubborn players for both projects. When the population is mixed, the set of stable strategy profiles is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. In fact, turning myopic players into farsighted ones eliminates gradually the inefficient Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider a social planner who can improve coordination by means of two policy instruments: adding links to the network (socialization) and/or turning myopic players into farsighted ones (education).

scholarly journals A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Quint ◽  
Martin Shubik
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Coordination Game

Comparing the tacit coordination of romantic couples and strangers

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Chartier ◽  
Matt E. Groebe ◽  
Susanne Abele
Keyword(s):  
Romantic Couples ◽  
Tacit Coordination

Behavioral strategies in a repeated pure coordination game

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rami Zwick ◽  
Alison King Chung Lo
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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