Cost Sharing in Health Insurance — A Reexamination

1995 ◽  
Vol 332 (17) ◽  
pp. 1164-1168 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Edith Rasell
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. E6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungwon Yoon ◽  
Michael A. Mooney ◽  
Michael A. Bohl ◽  
John P. Sheehy ◽  
Peter Nakaji ◽  
...  

OBJECTIVEWith drastic changes to the health insurance market, patient cost sharing has significantly increased in recent years. However, the patient financial burden, or out-of-pocket (OOP) costs, for surgical procedures is poorly understood. The goal of this study was to analyze patient OOP spending in cranial neurosurgery and identify drivers of OOP spending growth.METHODSFor 6569 consecutive patients who underwent cranial neurosurgery from 2013 to 2016 at the authors’ institution, the authors created univariate and multivariate mixed-effects models to investigate the effect of patient demographic and clinical factors on patient OOP spending. The authors examined OOP payments stratified into 10 subsets of case categories and created a generalized linear model to study the growth of OOP spending over time.RESULTSIn the multivariate model, case categories (craniotomy for pain, tumor, and vascular lesions), commercial insurance, and out-of-network plans were significant predictors of higher OOP payments for patients (all p < 0.05). Patient spending varied substantially across procedure types, with patients undergoing craniotomy for pain ($1151 ± $209) having the highest mean OOP payments. On average, commercially insured patients spent nearly twice as much in OOP payments as the overall population. From 2013 to 2016, the mean patient OOP spending increased 17%, from $598 to $698 per patient encounter. Commercially insured patients experienced more significant growth in OOP spending, with a cumulative rate of growth of 42% ($991 in 2013 to $1403 in 2016).CONCLUSIONSEven after controlling for inflation, case-mix differences, and partial fiscal periods, OOP spending for cranial neurosurgery patients significantly increased from 2013 to 2016. The mean OOP spending for commercially insured neurosurgical patients exceeded $1400 in 2016, with an average annual growth rate of 13%. As patient cost sharing in health insurance plans becomes more prevalent, patients and providers must consider the potential financial burden for patients receiving specialized neurosurgical care.


Author(s):  
Joseph P Newhouse ◽  
Willard G Manning ◽  
Carl N Morris ◽  
Larry L Orr ◽  
Naihua Duan ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Richard C. van Kleef ◽  
Wynand P. M. M. van de Ven ◽  
Rene C. J. A. van Vliet

An important goal of consumer cost-sharing in health insurance is to increase incentives for cost containment. A relatively new cost-sharing phenomenon is the “doughnut hole”: a gap in coverage starting at a predefined level of medical expenses. An important question is where to locate the starting point to achieve the strongest incentives for cost containment. We argue that the answer depends on an individual's health status. Using data from a Dutch insurer, this paper illustrates that using a risk-adjusted starting point results in both stronger incentives for cost containment and more equity than a uniform starting point.


1993 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Rice ◽  
Kenneth E. Thorpe

Author(s):  
Brigitte Dormont

Most developed nations provide generous coverage of care services, using either a tax financed healthcare system or social health insurance. Such systems pursue efficiency and equity in care provision. Efficiency means that expenditures are minimized for a given level of care services. Equity means that individuals with equal needs have equal access to the benefit package. In order to limit expenditures, social health insurance systems explicitly limit their benefit package. Moreover, most such systems have introduced cost sharing so that beneficiaries bear some cost when using care services. These limits on coverage create room for private insurance that complements or supplements social health insurance. Everywhere, social health insurance coexists along with voluntarily purchased supplementary private insurance. While the latter generally covers a small portion of health expenditures, it can interfere with the functioning of social health insurance. Supplementary health insurance can be detrimental to efficiency through several mechanisms. It limits competition in managed competition settings. It favors excessive care consumption through coverage of cost sharing and of services that are complementary to those included in social insurance benefits. It can also hinder achievement of the equity goals inherent to social insurance. Supplementary insurance creates inequality in access to services included in the social benefits package. Individuals with high incomes are more likely to buy supplementary insurance, and the additional care consumption resulting from better coverage creates additional costs that are borne by social health insurance. In addition, there are other anti-redistributive mechanisms from high to low risks. Social health insurance should be designed, not as an isolated institution, but with an awareness of the existence—and the possible expansion—of supplementary health insurance.


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