Interstate War

2017 ◽  
pp. 81-112
Author(s):  
Michael E. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Interstate War

The Self-Undermining State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
State Formation ◽  
Final Section ◽  
The State ◽  
The Self ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
External Threats ◽  
Willingness To Sacrifice ◽  
The Cost

This chapter provides an informal rationalist model of state formation as an exchange between a central authority and a population. In the model, the central authority protects the population against external threats and the population disarms and pays taxes. The model specifies the conditions under which the exchange is self-enforcing, meaning that the parties prefer the exchange to alternative courses of action. These conditions—costly but winnable interstate war—are historically rare, and the cost of such wars can rise beyond the population’s willingness to sacrifice. At this point, the population prefers to avoid war rather than fight it and may prefer an alternative institution to the state if that institution can prevent war and reduce the level of extraction. Thus the modern centralized state is self-undermining rather than self-enforcing. A final section addresses alternative explanations for state formation.

Pax Petrolica? Rethinking the Oil–Interstate War Linkage

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Hye Ryeon Jang ◽  
Benjamin Smith
Keyword(s):  
Interstate War

scholarly journals A deeper look at interstate war data: Interstate War Data version 1.1

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 205316801668384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Reiter ◽  
Allan C. Stam ◽  
Michael C. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Interstate War

Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1453-1474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Appel ◽  
Alyssa K. Prorok
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Likelihood ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Trade Networks ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
The Relationship

This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900–2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

International Recognition, Compliance Costs, and the Formalities of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 38-71
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter develops the main arguments of the book, focusing on how belligerents in interstate and civil war have reacted to the development of the laws of war detailed in Chapter 2. States involved in interstate war are perversely incentivized to evade the laws of war as these laws have proliferated. Thus, they are decreasingly likely to engage the formalities of war, specifically declarations of war and peace treaties. Secessionist rebel groups fighting civil wars aim to please the international community, and therefore are decreasingly likely to declare independence formally, generally likely to avoid targeting civilians, and increasingly likely to conclude peace treaties.

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