Reform of the EU Institutional Framework for Coastal Shipping: Concepts Concerning Greek Coastal Shipping Policy

2002 ◽  
pp. 217-229
Author(s):  
George P. Vlachos ◽  
Maria Lekakou
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Coastal Shipping ◽  
Shipping Policy ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Economic and financial integration in emerging markets: A European policy

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (164) ◽  
pp. 81-102
Author(s):  
Theodore Theodoropoulos ◽  
Borut Vojinovic
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Financial Integration ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
European Policy ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Mature Market ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Cyclical Volatility

This paper extends to test if the same short-run increase in cyclical volatility arising from financial integration is observed in this specific sample of "emerging markets". This work finds signs that, contrary to other emerging markets, this does not happen: for the future member states financial integration, similarly to the outcome observed in mature market economies, reduces cyclical volatility both in the short and in the long run. Weak indications are found that this may happen partially due to the anchoring of expectations provided by the EU Accession, and to the more robust institutional framework imposed by this process onto the countries in question.

The Party System: Structure, Policy, and Europeanization

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oskar Niedermayer
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Party System ◽  
National Level ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
System Properties ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Eu

The German party system has changed since the 1980s. The relatively stable ‘two-and-a-half party’ system of the 1960s and 1970s has become a fluid five-party system. This development can generally be attributed to changes on the demand and supply sides of party competition and to the changing institutional framework. The European integration process is part of this institutional framework and this chapter deals with the question of whether it has influenced the development of the party system at the national level. To systematically analyse the possible impact, eight party-system properties are distinguished: format, fragmentation, asymmetry, volatility, polarization, legitimacy, segmentation, and coalition stability. The analysis shows that one cannot speak of a Europeanization of the German party system in the sense of a considerable impact of the European integration process on its development. Up to now, the inclusion of Germany in the systemic context of the EU has not led to noticeable changes of party-system properties. On the demand side of party competition, this is due to the fact that the EU issue does not influence the citizens' electoral decisions. On the supply side, the lack of Europeanization can be explained mainly by the traditional, interest-based pro-European élite consensus, the low potential for political mobilization around European integration, and the marginal role of ethnocentrist–authoritarian parties.

EU-Swiss institutional framework progress will be slow

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

Significance Without a dispute settlement mechanism in Swiss-EU relations, Switzerland has no legal leverage to defend its rights. Ironically, such a mechanism is the most controversial element of the institutional framework that Switzerland and the EU have been negotiating since 2014. Impacts If Bern dilutes labour market rules to secure EU concessions, this could prompt new alliances between Swiss left- and right-wing parties. Firms based in the EU will continue to be able to buy and sell titles on the Swiss stock exchange at least until end-2018. A new agreement (pending ratification) will allow 54 heavy-polluting Swiss firms to participate in the EU emission trading system. Joining the European Railway Agency will allow Bern to access technical assistance and facilitate Swiss train operations in the EU. If Bern abides by its plans to renew cohesion payments, new EU member states may obtain funding for vocational education projects.

3 The Regulatory and Institutional Framework of EU Cartel Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with the institutional and regulatory framework that applies to cartels in the European Union (EU), going over both the substantive and procedural rules. The key legal basis for the prosecution of cartels resides under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted by the case law of the EU courts. Article 101 TFEU is a three-pronged provision. First, the chapter shows how Article 101(1) TFEU establishes a prohibition rule providing that any agreement between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which restricts competition is to be deemed incompatible with the internal market. Next, the chapter takes a look at how Article 101(2) TFEU declares that agreements deemed incompatible pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU are null and void. The ways in which Article 101(3) TFEU embodies an exception to the default prohibition rule, which defuses the application of Article 101(1) for agreements that bring a positive net contribution to consumer welfare, is also discussed.

The Constitutional Price for International Unilateralism in the European Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 320-360
Author(s):  
Adrian Dumitrescu-Pasecinic
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In order to enter the Banking Union, non-euro EU Member States must ‘step outside’ the EU legal order and the Union’s institutional framework, and resort to unilateral instruments of public international law. If the intergovernmental method has advanced the alternative project of integration based on voluntary policy, international unilateralism is seen as a similar integration technique based on the voluntary action of non-euro Member States, ie a tool for deeper integration that appears as a variation of intergovernmentalism. This article focuses on the constitutional deficiencies caused by the choice of unilateral instruments in the institutional set-up of a close cooperation arrangement in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. At first sight, leaving the EU legal order and entering the world of international law opens entirely new perspectives for the participating Member States. The possible attraction is escaping the constraining institutional framework of EU law. However, the international law route poses significant constitutional challenges vis-à-vis compatibility with the EU law.

scholarly journals Organized Economic Interests and European Integration: the Question of (neo)corporatism

Equilibrium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Anna Ząbkowicz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
European Integration ◽  
European Commission ◽  
National Level ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Social Dialogue ◽  
International Environment ◽  
The Eu

When economic development is considered, political economy is at stake; in this perspective growth or counter-growth forces operate within the institutional framework. The analysis focuses on corporatist forms of social dialogue in the international environment of the EU and within the European structures. First, the notion of corporatism as opposed to other institutionalized channels of access is explained. Then, the paper presents corporatist forms at the national level under change. Next, it deals with interest coordination at the European Commission level. The paper concludes that an erosion of corporatist forms is visible; no embracing pattern in the EU should be expected instead; on the contrary, increasing fragmentation of lobbying is observed.

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