2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOY LANGSTON

The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the ‘informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was a difficult process. President Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not. Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits become even more important because of the loss of the omnipotent president who once exacted cooperation from all actors within the party and the regime.


2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Morales Quiroga

AbstractThe Concertación lost the recent presidential elections in Chile after 20 years in office. This article proposes three explanations for this result. First, the Concertación's candidate selection process through primaries was exclusionary, without opening up participation to all potential applicants. This combined with a deep erosion of the coalition, reflected in the resignation of deputies and senators from parties that compose it. The process was accelerated with the emergence of an independent candidate, formerly from the Concertación. Second, the candidate from the right increased his vote in the poorest sectors and expanded the right's constituency to middle-class segments, traditional Concertación electoral strongholds. Third, the right achieved greater electoral consistency than the Concertación by reducing the number of voters who split their tickets. Its presidential candidate obtained almost the same percentage as its list of deputies.


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