Transition to Intra-Party Democracy: The Korean Presidential Candidate Selection System

2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-155
Author(s):  
Hyun-Chool Lee
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ihsan

The problem of elections in public office is often interesting to study, especially with the development of the electoral system which is continually being renewed to prevent corruption, collusion and nepotism, as well as to get candidates who are capable in their fields. One of these public offices which is Aceh-specific is Wali Nanggroe. This institution is a mandate of Aceh Government Law Number 11 of 2006. The determination of the Wali Nanggroe for the 2018-2023 period raises legal problems. Therefore this study will examine the wali nanggroe candidate selection system, the mechanism for selecting wali nanggroe based on Qanun number 8 of 2012, and whether there is a legal flaw in the election of wali nanggroe for the 2018-2023 period. This study uses a normative legal research method with a Law and Conceptual approach. The results of the research show that the wali nanggroe candidate selection system has not been carried out openly and transparently, even though Qanun allows for other candidates, in terms of election mechanisms, according to Qanun, an Election Commission must be formed in which there are 4 elements, but in practice the Commission Elections were not formed, this would be legally problematic, even legally flawed because one of the elements of the Election Commission was not involved as a member of the Election Commission as regulated by the Qanun. The elements that were not involved were representatives of ulama in each district/city.


2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOY LANGSTON

The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the ‘informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was a difficult process. President Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not. Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits become even more important because of the loss of the omnipotent president who once exacted cooperation from all actors within the party and the regime.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1147-1151
Author(s):  
John Chang ◽  
James S. Taylor

ABSTRACT The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), U.S. Department of Transportation plans and conducts about 20 government-led tabletop exercises and two area exercises annually under its Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) drill program. Until recently, one of the main objectives in the drill candidate selection process each year was to select a mixture of operators whose pipeline facility spill response plans represented the range of plans required under the agency's OPA 90 regulation. The annual list of drill candidates represented large to small operators transporting crude oil and refined products in various regions of the country. While this approach has worked well, OPS wanted to ensure that the selection process was not inadvertently missing operators whose pipeline facility spills pose the greatest threats to safety and the environment. As a result, OPS developed a quantitative-based process to identify drill candidates. The process uses weighted factors, including input from the Regional Pipeline Safety Offices combined with professional judgment to produce a risk-based approach to help OPS select the operators to drill.


2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Morales Quiroga

AbstractThe Concertación lost the recent presidential elections in Chile after 20 years in office. This article proposes three explanations for this result. First, the Concertación's candidate selection process through primaries was exclusionary, without opening up participation to all potential applicants. This combined with a deep erosion of the coalition, reflected in the resignation of deputies and senators from parties that compose it. The process was accelerated with the emergence of an independent candidate, formerly from the Concertación. Second, the candidate from the right increased his vote in the poorest sectors and expanded the right's constituency to middle-class segments, traditional Concertación electoral strongholds. Third, the right achieved greater electoral consistency than the Concertación by reducing the number of voters who split their tickets. Its presidential candidate obtained almost the same percentage as its list of deputies.


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