A Study on the Change of Presidential Candidate Selection Method in Korea

The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the ‘informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was a difficult process. President Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not. Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits become even more important because of the loss of the omnipotent president who once exacted cooperation from all actors within the party and the regime.

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The Concertación's Defeat in Chile's 2009–2010 Presidential Elections

Latin American Politics and Society ◽

10.1111/j.1548-2456.2012.00154.x ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 54 (2) ◽

pp. 79-107 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Mauricio Morales Quiroga

Keyword(s):

Middle Class ◽

Presidential Elections ◽

Selection Process ◽

Candidate Selection ◽

Presidential Candidate ◽

The Right ◽

Opening Up

AbstractThe Concertación lost the recent presidential elections in Chile after 20 years in office. This article proposes three explanations for this result. First, the Concertación's candidate selection process through primaries was exclusionary, without opening up participation to all potential applicants. This combined with a deep erosion of the coalition, reflected in the resignation of deputies and senators from parties that compose it. The process was accelerated with the emergence of an independent candidate, formerly from the Concertación. Second, the candidate from the right increased his vote in the poorest sectors and expanded the right's constituency to middle-class segments, traditional Concertación electoral strongholds. Third, the right achieved greater electoral consistency than the Concertación by reducing the number of voters who split their tickets. Its presidential candidate obtained almost the same percentage as its list of deputies.

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Institutional reforms and their effect on legislators’ behavior

Party Politics ◽

10.1177/1354068815595213 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 23 (3) ◽

pp. 297-308 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Yael Shomer

Keyword(s):

Empirical Evidence ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Selection Method ◽

Candidate Selection ◽

Interactive Effects ◽

Institutional Reforms ◽

Selection Procedures ◽

Conditional Effect ◽

Selection Mechanisms ◽

Party Behavior

Do electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures influence the degree to which parties act in unison? Whereas the theoretical literature is quite clear about the hypothetical effect of these institutions, empirical evidence is mixed. In this article, I solve the puzzle and theorize about the interactive effects of elections and selections on parties’ behavior. I argue that the effect of candidate selections depends on the electoral environment within which they operate. Specifically, in an electoral environment that creates incentives for candidate-centeredness, the less restrictive the selection method a party uses, the less unified its record; whereas in an electoral environment that emphasizes party-centeredness, the effect of selections on unity is more muted. Using the electoral reform and divergent selection mechanisms characterizing Israel during the last three decades and utilizing Rice Scores, I provide support for the conditional effect of electoral systems and selection procedures on party behavior.

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Pilot-Candidate Selection Method: Sources of Validity

International Journal of Aviation Psychology ◽

10.1207/s15327108ijap0402_1 ◽

1994 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 103-117 ◽

Cited By ~ 29

Author(s):

Thomas R. Carretta ◽

Malcolm James Ree

Keyword(s):

Selection Method ◽

Candidate Selection

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Unpacking Party Unity: The Combined Effects of Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Attitudes and Behavioural Norms

Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0032321716634094 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 65 (2) ◽

pp. 452-474 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Reut Itzkovitch-Malka ◽

Reuven Y Hazan

Keyword(s):

Electoral Systems ◽

Electoral System ◽

Selection Method ◽

Party Competition ◽

Candidate Selection ◽

Combined Effects ◽

Selection Methods ◽

Party Loyalty ◽

European Parties ◽

Using Data

This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effect of inter- as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two, in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods, however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.

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Which Candidate Selection Method is the Most Democratic?

Government and Opposition ◽

10.1111/j.1477-7053.2008.01276.x ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 44 (1) ◽

pp. 68-90 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Gideon Rahat

Keyword(s):

Majority Vote ◽

Selection Method ◽

Candidate Selection ◽

Checks And Balances ◽

Second Stage ◽

National Centre ◽

Special Procedure ◽

Central Elements ◽

Small Committee ◽

Party Members

AbstractThis article suggests guidelines for identifying the ramifications of central elements of candidate selection methods for various democratic dimensions – participation, competition, representation and responsiveness – and analyses their possible role in supplying checks and balances. It proposes employing a three-stage candidate selection method: in the first stage a small committee appoints candidates to a shortlist; in the second stage a selected party agency may add or remove candidates using a special procedure (absolute majority vote, for example) and also ratify the re-adoption of incumbent candidates; and, finally, party members select candidates for safe seats or safe list positions among the proposed candidates. The article also recommends employing moderate requirements for candidacy; the use of a non-majoritarian voting method; and allowing the national centre a say in candidate selection.

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