The Structure of Municipal Voting in Vancouver

We offer a new interpretation of the structure of municipal electoral competition in Vancouver, focusing on the city’s high-profile municipal election in 2018. Using novel “cast vote records” – a dataset containing each of the 176,450 ballots cast in the city’s municipal election – we use a Bayesian multidimensional scaling procedure to estimate the location of every 2018 candidate and voter in Vancouver in a shared two-dimensional political space. We then match observed votes from the cast vote records to survey responses in the Canadian Municipal Election Study (CMES), a large election survey undertaken in Vancouver in 2018, using 96 CMES variables to interpret our two measured dimensions of electoral competition. We find evidence of a single primary dimension of competition, structured by left-right ideology, along with a secondary dimension dividing establishment from upstart parties of the right. Our paper supplies a new interpretation of Vancouver’s electoral landscape, clarifies our understanding of the role of left-right ideology in municipal electoral competition, and demonstrates the promise of cast vote records for research on municipal elections and voting.

Determinants of Fiscal Transparency and Right to Information Reforms: A Study of Provincial Governments in Argentina

Using a novel dataset and conducting a multiple linear regression analysis, this study aims to answer the following research question: What explains the variation in the level of provincial government transparency in Argentina? This article examines two policy areas—fiscal transparency and right to information (RTI)—and tests five hypotheses related to democracy (electoral competition and turnover), government digital capacity, citizens’ internet access, and press visibility. Fiscal transparency is positively associated with electoral competition and population size; RTI law strength appears to be positively associated with gubernatorial turnover and development. However, government digital capacity, citizens’ internet access and press visibility do not appear to significantly influence transparency levels.

Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition

This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority rules may not always lead to moderate policies once electoral competition is considered.

Partisan political connections, ethnic tribalism, and firm performance

This paper investigates the impact of partisan political connections and ethnic tribalism on firm performance in a hyper-partisan political environment. Although existing literature generally shows that political connections improve firm performance, we argue that under the theory of electoral competition, political connections can be a double-edged sword because of the tension of partisan politics. Hence, we expect that changes in government can affect firm performance. Using a unique dataset from Nigeria, we find that political connections are valuable when a firm's patron party is in power, whereas they are detrimental to firm value when their patron party is in opposition. Furthermore, we find that CEO ethnic tribal affiliation with the President improves firm performance even when the firm's patron party is in opposition. This paper extends the literature on political connections and helps managers and policymakers understand the timely use of political connections in a hyper-partisan environment.

Changing Prices in a Changing Climate: Electoral Competition and Fossil Fuel Taxation

When do governments increase the price of fossil fuels? Charting the theoretical territory between climate change politics and long-term policymaking, this paper highlights the role of electoral competition in shaping how politicians respond to the intertemporal tradeoff fossil fuel taxation represents. The more secure the government is in office, the more insulated it is from the vagaries of political competition, and the more likely it is to impose costs on constituents today to generate a future stable climate. By influencing governments’ time preferences, competition structures the myopia of elected officials. I test the arguments using an original dataset of gasoline taxation across high-income democracies between 1988-2013. I find evidence that higher levels of competition are associated with lower gasoline tax rates, and that the relationship is moderated by the level of costs imposed on voters, but not government partisanship.

Ambiguous Platforms and Correlated Preferences: Experimental Evidence

This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, a model of electoral competition that allows for platforms where candidates may be ambiguous about which policy they will implement if elected. We argue that uncertainty about the policy preferences of the electorate, combined with perceived similarity of voters and candidates, can lead to the latter running on these ambiguous platforms. By appealing to voters from both ends of the spectrum, such platforms can ensure electoral success for noncentrist candidates in a sufficiently polarized society. Ambiguous platforms pose a threat to democratic representation because winning noncentrists always implement policies in favor of a minority and against the preferences of the majority. In our laboratory experiment, ambiguous platforms are chosen frequently by candidates and gain notable support from voters. Our main treatment variation provides causal evidence that ambiguous platforms are more popular among noncentrist voters if one of the candidates is a known centrist.