Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000

2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOY LANGSTON
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Presidential Candidate ◽  
Informal Rules ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the ‘informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was a difficult process. President Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not. Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits become even more important because of the loss of the omnipotent president who once exacted cooperation from all actors within the party and the regime.

The Concertación's Defeat in Chile's 2009–2010 Presidential Elections

2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Morales Quiroga
Keyword(s):  
Middle Class ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Presidential Candidate ◽  
The Right ◽  
Opening Up

AbstractThe Concertación lost the recent presidential elections in Chile after 20 years in office. This article proposes three explanations for this result. First, the Concertación's candidate selection process through primaries was exclusionary, without opening up participation to all potential applicants. This combined with a deep erosion of the coalition, reflected in the resignation of deputies and senators from parties that compose it. The process was accelerated with the emergence of an independent candidate, formerly from the Concertación. Second, the candidate from the right increased his vote in the poorest sectors and expanded the right's constituency to middle-class segments, traditional Concertación electoral strongholds. Third, the right achieved greater electoral consistency than the Concertación by reducing the number of voters who split their tickets. Its presidential candidate obtained almost the same percentage as its list of deputies.

scholarly journals Simultaneous Elections and the Rise of Female Representation in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
Luky Sandra Amalia ◽  
Aisah Putri Budiatri ◽  
Mouliza KD. Sweinstani ◽  
Atika Nur Kusumaningtyas ◽  
Esty Ekawati
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Institutional Innovation ◽  
Presidential Candidate ◽  
Female Representation ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Women Candidates ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Legislative Election

In the 2019 election, the proportion of women elected to Indonesia’s People’s Representative Assembly ( Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) increased significantly to almost 21 per cent. In this article, we ask whether an institutional innovation – the introduction of simultaneous presidential and legislative elections – contributed to this change. We examine the election results, demonstrating that, overall, women candidates did particularly well in provinces where the presidential candidate nominated by their party won a majority of the vote. Having established quantitatively a connection between results of the presidential elections and outcomes for women legislative candidates, we turn to our qualitative findings to seek a mechanism explaining this outcome. We argue that the simultaneous elections helped women candidates by easing their access to voters who supported one of the presidential candidates, but who were undecided on the legislative election. Rather than imposing additional burdens on female candidates, simultaneous elections assisted them.

Sharing is caring: the role of voter-candidate similarities in intra-party electoral competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick F. A. van Erkel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Underrepresented Groups ◽  
Candidate Characteristics

AbstractPrevious studies have found similarities with presidential candidates or party leaders to be an important factor in explaining voting behaviour. However, with the exception of gender, few studies have structurally studied voter-candidate similarities in intra-party electoral competition. This study investigates the Belgian case and argues that voter-candidate similarities play a role in the decision-making process of citizens when casting preferential votes. Moreover, it investigates whether underrepresented groups, and especially women, are more guided by these voter-candidate similarities than overrepresented groups. To achieve this aim voter and candidate characteristics are modelled simultaneously. This enables an investigation of the decision-making process of voters while taking into account structural inequalities at the supply side. The results demonstrate that citizens are indeed more likely to cast preferential votes for candidates similar to themselves and that these effects are stronger for underrepresented groups. Hence, preferential voting could ultimately pave the way for better descriptive representation.

Changes to Candidate Selection and Political Recruitment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
National Party ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Political Recruitment ◽  
Demand Control

This chapter examines how the PRI’s candidate selection and recruitment changed from the hegemonic to the democratic era to capture how electoral competition strengthened the governors at the expense the corporatist sectors and other PRI groups. Under hegemony, the president controlled (through choosing or vetoing) which PRI politician appeared on the ballot, and thus could punish or benefit ambitious politicians within the wide-flung coalition. Once competition grew, however, a candidate’s popularity with voters began to weigh on these decisions and governors began to demand control over nominations for subnational and federal posts. Regime leaders had to devolve power over federal candidacies to state executives because of their ability to win votes for the party, decentralizing the party. National party leaders won a good deal of control over the closed-list PR seats for both the Chamber and the Senate. Most party-affiliated unions lost nomination power because they were unable to choose popular candidates or procure electoral victories, weakening their position within the party.

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