Comment on “The Latin American Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective” by José Antonio Ocampo

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Sanguinetti
Keyword(s):  
1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 221-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Paus

Since 1982, most Latin American countries have witnessed slow economic growth and a persistent net transfer of funds to the rest of the world as a result of sharply reduced inflows of private international bank lending and large debt payment obligations. Against this background direct foreign investment (DFI) has received increasing attention as one important element in overcoming the present stagnation-cum-debt crisis as well as in contributing to renewed economic growth. This article explores the possible contributions of DFI to the future economic growth and development of the region.1


2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (9) ◽  
pp. 1179-1211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grigore Pop-Eleches

This article analyzes the interaction between economic crises and partisan politics during International Monetary Fund program initiation in Latin America in the 1980s and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The author argues that economic crises are at least in part in the eye of the beholder, and therefore policy responses reflect the interaction between crisis intensity and the government's partisan interpretation of the crisis, which in turn depends on the nature of the economic crisis and its broader regional and international environment. Using cross-country statistical evidence from the two regions, the article shows that certain types of crises, such as liquidity shortfalls, elicit similar responses across the ideological spectrum and regional contexts. By contrast, debt repayment and domestic crises are more prone to divergent ideological interpretations, but the extent of partisan divergence is context sensitive in that it occurred during the Latin American debt crisis but not in the post-communist transition.


1985 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Cohen

The global debt problem influences the foreign-policy capabilities of the United States through its impact on the government's “linkage strategies” in foreign affairs. In some circumstances policy makers are forced to make connections between different policy instruments or issues that might not otherwise have been felt necessary; in others, opportunities for connections are created that might not otherwise have been felt possible. The Polish debt crisis of 1981–82, the Latin American debt crisis of 1982–83, and the IMF quota increase in 1983 are suggestive in this regard. Linkage strategies bred by the debt issue are more apt to be successful when the interest shared by the United States with other countries in avoiding default is reinforced by other shared economic or political interests. They will also be more successful to the extent that the government can supplement its own power resources by relating bank decisions to foreign-policy considerations. Power in such situations, however, is a wasting asset, even when employed indirectly through the intermediation of the IMF.


2019 ◽  
pp. 124-136
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Unlike the 1930s, when debt moratoriums were widespread, the debt crisis of the 1980s was marked by a striking absence of unilateral default. With payment suspensions effectively ruled out as a permissible policy response, debtors and creditors engaged in a concerted effort to reschedule the amortization of principal, refinance maturing obligations and prevent an interruption of interest service at all costs. The chapter shows how the highly concentrated and interlocked nature of syndicated lending contributed to the emergence of a coherent international creditors' cartel that was capable of effectively coordinating collective action among the major Wall Street banks, keeping the debtors in the lending game by rolling over maturing obligations while simultaneously imposing strict market discipline on the borrowing governments through the credible threat of a refusal of further credit in the event of noncompliance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Aizenman ◽  
Hiro Ito

This paper investigates the potential impacts of the degree of divergence in open macroeconomic policies in the context of the trilemma hypothesis. Using an index that measures the extent of policy divergence among the three trilemma policy choices—monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness—we find that emerging market economies have adopted trilemma policy combinations with the smallest degree of policy divergence in the last 15 years. We then investigate whether and to what extent the degree of open macro policy convergence affects the probability of a crisis and find that a developing or emerging market economy with a higher degree of policy divergence is more likely to experience a currency or debt crisis. We also compare the development of trilemma policies around the crisis period for the groups of Latin American crisis countries in the 1980s and the Asian crisis countries in the 1990s. We find that Latin American crisis countries tended to close their capital accounts in the aftermath of a crisis, while that is not the case for the Asian crisis countries. The Asian crisis countries tended to reduce the degree of policy divergence in the aftermath of the crisis, which possibly meant they decided to adopt open macro policies that made their economies less prone to a crisis.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Cavarozzi

Transitions into democracy: convergence and distinct pathsIn mid-1982 Mexico's Minister of Finance, Jesús Silva Herzog, arrived in the United States and announced that his country was not going to continue paying its foreign debt. Silva Herzog's declaration was soon followed by debt defaults in many other Latin American countries, marking the beginning of the region's most serious economic crisis in this century. This crisis involved the partial breakdown of Latin America's financial and trade linkages to the world economy; the cessation of new credit money paralleled an interruption in the flow of capital investments, amounting to a total reversal of the financial patterns of previous decades. (The level of foreign investment, especially in manufacturing and mining, had been relatively high since the mid-1950s, albeit with significant differences from country to country).The debt crisis coincided, not incidentally, with a convergence of the political trajectories of five of the region's more industrialised countries: Mexico, Brazil, and the three Southern Cone nations of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. All five governments – the South American military dictatorships and Mexico's stable authoritarian PRI regime – experienced periods of political turbulence closely related both to the severe economic disruptions and to other domestic and international influences.One of the remarkable aspects of this 1982 political convergence was that it came after the ‘long decade’ of the 1970s, during which the governmental routes of the five countries had been extremely divergent. In Argentina, for example, instability, militarism and political violence had intensified, starting in 1969; these phenomena then spread to its traditionally more democratic neighbours, Chile and Uruguay.


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