Disaggregating democracy aid to explain peaceful democratisation after civil wars

Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.

Do Successor Parties Influence Public Attitudes toward the Past? Evidence from Young Democracies

What explains how citizens living in young democracies feel about their authoritarian past? While the impact of autocratic legacies on support for democracy and left–right placement has been thoroughly studied, we know less about the determinants of attitudes toward the past in post-authoritarian democracies. This study relies on survey data collected in Southern and Central European countries ten years after their transitions to democracy in order to test context-dependent variance in the relevance of ideology and party identification on citizen attitudes toward the past. The results show that classical factors such as regime type and mode of transition are not the main determinants of the politicization of attitudes toward the past and that the existence of a strong authoritarian successor party is associated with stronger politicization of the past.

Power-sharing and the quality of democracy

Mounting evidence indicates that power-sharing supports transitions to democracy. However, the resulting quality of democracy remains understudied. Given the increasing global spread of power-sharing, this is a crucial oversight, as prominent critiques accuse it of a number of critical deficiencies. The present article advances this literature in two ways. First, it offers a comprehensive discussion of how power-sharing affects the quality of democracy, going beyond specific individual aspects of democracy. It argues that power-sharing advances some of these aspects while having drawbacks for others. Second, it offers the first systematic, large-N analysis of the frequently discussed consequences of power-sharing for the quality of democracy. It relies on a dataset measuring the quality of democracy in 70 countries worldwide, combining it with new fine-grained data for institutional power-sharing. The results indicate that power-sharing is a complex institutional model which privileges a particular set of democratic actors and processes, while deemphasizing others.

How can we Agree on Anything in This Environment? Tunisian Media, Transition and Elite Compromises: A View From Parliament

The literature on the role of the media during processes of transitions to democracy is divided over the positive or negative influence media outlets have. Both theoretically and empirically cases can be substantiated. In the case of the 2011 Arab revolts, however, there is a scholarly consensus that the media—traditional and social—have negatively affected the processes of transitions. While the criticism of the role of the media is empirically borne out, it does not explain how Tunisia was able to consolidate its democracy despite a polarizing media environment. Based on participant observation and interviews, the article argues that the inner workings of the Constituent Assembly and the role of individual deputies were crucial in overcoming a hostile atmosphere. This suggests that the role of political actors in negotiating the new rules of the game is more important than other factors shaping a transition.

Weapons of the Strong: Elite Resistance and the Neo-Apartheid City

Transitions to democracy promise equal political power. But political ruptures carry no guarantee that democracy can overcome the accumulated inequalities of history. In South Africa, the transition to democracy shifted power from a racial minority in ways that suggested an unusually high probability of material change. This article analyzes the limits of public power after democratic transitions. Why has the post-Apartheid local state in Johannesburg been unable to achieve a spatially inclusive distribution of public goods despite a political imperative for both spatial and fiscal redistribution? I rely on interviews and archival research, conducted in Johannesburg between 2015 and 2018. Because the color line created a sharp distinction between political and economic power, traditional white urban elites required non-majoritarian and hidden strategies that translated their structural power into effective power. The cumulative effect of these “weapons of the strong” has been to disable the capacity of the local state to countervail the power of wealthy residents’ associations and property developers. Through these strategies, elites repurposed institutional reforms for redistribution to instead reproduce the city’s inequalities.

Democratic transitions and monetary policy: are democratic central banks different?

Empirical studies have shown democracies to be more supportive of pro-market institutions than authoritarian regimes; however, to date, it is virtually unknown through which channel democracy might actually create institutional improvements. In addition, causality between democracy and economic institutions is anything but clear, as competing hypotheses highlight. In this article, we examine the possible association of democratisation and political instability with sound monetary policy and the independence of central banks, both of which can be considered central pillars of an economic policy aimed at producing overall prosperity. Results mainly indicate that stable transitions to democracy are followed by strongly improved access to sound money and more independent central banks, probably because stable shifts to electoral democracy create incentives for policymakers to refrain from using monetary policy for short-run gains. Conversely, we also find evidence that especially unstable democratic transitions could impede the establishment of a more independent central bank, making inflationary policies and high money growth more likely.

Central America since the 1990s: Crime, Violence, and the Pursuit of Democracy

Central America’s transitions to democracy and the end of civil wars in the 1990s brought the promise of peace, yet the region’s new democracies have struggled with epidemic levels of violence since the early 2000s. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are among the deadliest countries in the world. Even peaceful Costa Rica was plagued by drug trafficking and organized crime. While the political violence of the 1980s has largely been replaced by criminal violence, political violence remains a problem in some countries. Nicaragua, which escaped the homicide epidemics of its neighbors, experienced a wave of political violence in 2018 and 2019. I explore the causes of violence and insecurity in the region, attempts by regional governments to combat crime, and the impact of crime on citizens’ attitudes toward democracy.