Abstract
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is frequently used by the US law enforcement authorities to prosecute both US and foreign firms for bribery in foreign host countries. Evidence increasingly shows that anti-bribery enforcement is associated with a reduction in foreign investment inflows to host countries associated with enforcement actions. The determinants of enforcement actions remain understudied, however. I argue that enforcement actions are often political in nature, operating as de-facto sanctions against targeted countries. FCPA prosecutions can thus be viewed as a tool of economic statecraft, designed to reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to targeted states and enforce US foreign policy objectives. Using data on FCPA enforcement actions along with data on UN voting patterns, alliances, and US foreign aid, I find that FCPA enforcement actions are more likely to target firms that bribe in host countries with foreign policy preferences that diverge from the United States. This paper is among the first to empirically study the determinants of anti-bribery enforcement and to explicitly consider the political nature of FCPA prosecutions. These findings have broad implication for political economy research on foreign investment, economic statecraft, and corruption.
