Quantum-like dynamics of decision-making in prisoner's dilemma game

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masanari Asano ◽  
Irina Basieva ◽  
Andrei Khrennikov ◽  
Masanori Ohya ◽  
Yoshiharu Tanaka
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

THE DIVERSITY IN THE DECISION FACILITATES COOPERATION IN THE SEQUENTIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 377-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
TETSUSHI OHDAIRA ◽  
TAKAO TERANO
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Novel Method ◽  
The One ◽  
High Level

The condition of cooperation in social conflicts of interest has been an interesting topic. On the one hand people usually desire to make their own profit. On the other hand, they mutually cooperate. This fact has motivated many researchers. Some solutions for this question have been proposed, and particular studies indicate that the diversity in decision-making or relationships promotes cooperation. In this research, we achieve the diversity by utilizing the novel method that refers to the mechanism of correction regarding each probability that every strategy comes to the representative by decision-making of group. This mechanism works when difference between the probability of the first and others becomes quite large. If once every group adopts this corrected decision, he/she achieves mutual cooperation of high level in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game in case the number of strategies (= players) is within the definite range. We also note that this game can effectively describe the property of evolution of strategy only with a small number of players. When each group has many players, in contrast to previous research, the decision with correction also has an effect on the suppression of prevalence of defection. In addition, we also show that the decision of this model is analogous to the system of redistribution of revenue, which provides balance of strength between several teams in professional sports.

scholarly journals The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study

PLoS ONE ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. e0175492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia G. Peshkovskaya ◽  
Tatiana S. Babkina ◽  
Mikhail G. Myagkov ◽  
Ivan A. Kulikov ◽  
Ksenia V. Ekshova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Eye Tracking ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

THE SHIFT TO COMPETITION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

1976 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayala Pines
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Group Effect ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Patterns Of Behavior ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The relative power of cooperative and trusting patterns of behavior versus those of exploitation and distrust in affecting the results of group decision-making processes was investigated. The outcome of a study using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game seems to suggest the disproportionate influence of competitive people in these settings. When groups consisting of cooperative and competitive players were asked to reach a unanimous decision about game strategy, in the majority of cases their decision was not to cooperate. This is a rather disturbing finding in light of the prevalence and importance of group decisions in everyday life. Three additional studies were carried out in an attempt to explore some alternative explanations of this shift to competition. The combined outcome of the three studies suggests that the shift to competition is reflecting both a group effect and a player effect.

scholarly journals Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tessa Haesevoets ◽  
Dries H. Bostyn ◽  
Chris Reinders Folmer ◽  
Arne Roets ◽  
Alain Van Hiel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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