Paying for Local Government: An Appraisal of the British Government's Proposals for Nondomestic Rates

1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
R Jackman

In its recent Green Paper on local government finance, the British Government has proposed that the existing system of nondomestic rates be replaced by a uniform and centrally determined rate poundage. This idea has merit in principle in that it could improve the accountability of local authorities to local residents. But it is argued that the particular proposals in the Green Paper are deficient in ignoring the need for accountability in services provided to local businesses, and in failing to examine the rationale for retaining business rates within a reformed system.

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 684-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Curtis

This article surveys a number of key elements of the government's localism agenda, particularly as it relates to local government finance. It concludes that this is a genuine attempt to free up local authorities to innovate and control their own resources, but that the toxic climate and emphasis on central guidance may undermine it.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
G A Boyne

In this paper the effectiveness of local tax equalisation across English local authorities since 1981 is evaluated. Two specific aims of equalisation policies are identified. Proportional rate equalisation implies that variations in needs and resources should be neutralised and that tax levels should depend on local spending decisions. Strict rate equalisation implies that local taxes should not exceed the levels specified by central government. The statistical evidence indicates that neither of these aims has been achieved since 1981. The main obstacles to proportional rate equalisation are differences in grant funding and inadequate compensation for variations in needs and resources. The main obstacle to strict rate equalisation is incrementalism in local budgeting. The implications of the planned reforms of local government finance are analysed. It is concluded that equalisation may be more effective under the new system of local taxes and central grants.


1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce K. Murray

In June 1914 David Lloyd George, Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, capitulated to opposition from within his own party and withdrew from the Budget for 1914–15 his proposals to revise the system of Exchequer grants to local authorities and to establish land value rating. Withdrawal was a considerable political humiliation for Lloyd George. “His stock stands low in the party,” commented his friend, Lord Riddell, in his diary. “The Budget has been a fiasco.” What went wrong with the 1914 Budget is the concern of this article.Lloyd George's 1914 Budget incorporated two distinct strategies. The first comprised a fiscal strategy designed to provide in a single “taxing” Budget for the needs of both the Navy and the reorganization of local government finance and taxation. The second constituted part of a wider political strategy intended to furnish a reform program that would enable the Liberals to make a powerful progressive appeal at the next general election, due by the end of 1915. The first was supposed to serve the second, but in the event had the opposite result. It prompted Lloyd George to abandon his original plan of building up to a major reform Budget in 1915 and to proceed instead to include in the 1914 Budget “provisional” grants to local authorities before he had prepared the groundwork, administratively, legislatively or politically, for a new system of grants and rating. At all levels, the enterprise was premature, and simply presented a group of discontented wealthy Liberals in the Commons with the opportunity to stage an effective protest against the direction of Liberal finance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document