scholarly journals Revised analysis shows relational mobility predicts sacrificial behavior in Footbridge but not Switch or Loop trolley problems

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (24) ◽  
pp. 13203-13204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Claessens ◽  
Thanos Kyritsis ◽  
Quentin D. Atkinson
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 621-659
Author(s):  
Lewis Hammond ◽  
Vaishak Belle

AbstractMoral responsibility is a major concern in autonomous systems, with applications ranging from self-driving cars to kidney exchanges. Although there have been recent attempts to formalise responsibility and blame, among similar notions, the problem of learning within these formalisms has been unaddressed. From the viewpoint of such systems, the urgent questions are: (a) How can models of moral scenarios and blameworthiness be extracted and learnt automatically from data? (b) How can judgements be computed effectively and efficiently, given the split-second decision points faced by some systems? By building on constrained tractable probabilistic learning, we propose and implement a hybrid (between data-driven and rule-based methods) learning framework for inducing models of such scenarios automatically from data and reasoning tractably from them. We report on experiments that compare our system with human judgement in three illustrative domains: lung cancer staging, teamwork management, and trolley problems.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
James O’Connor ◽  

The hypothetical scenarios generally known as trolley problems have become widespread in recent moral philosophy. They invariably require an agent to choose one of a strictly limited number of options, all of them bad. Although they don’t always involve trolleys / trams, and are used to make a wide variety of points, what makes it justified to speak of a distinctive “trolley method” is the characteristic assumption that the intuitive reactions that all these artificial situations elicit constitute an appropriate guide to real-life moral reasoning. I dispute this assumption by arguing that trolley cases inevitably constrain the supposed rescuers into behaving in ways that clearly deviate from psychologically healthy, and morally defensible, human behavior. Through this focus on a generally overlooked aspect of trolley theorizing – namely, the highly impoverished role invariably allotted to the would-be rescuer in these scenarios – I aim to challenge the complacent twin assumptions of advocates of the trolley method that this approach to moral reasoning has practical value, and is in any case innocuous. Neither assumption is true.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
john mikhail

by focusing on mistaken judgments, sunstein provides a theory of performance errors without a theory of moral competence. additionally, sunstein's objections to thought experiments like the footbridge and trolley problems are unsound. exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences, and these problems enable us to uncover the implicit structure of our moral intuitions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 292-297
Author(s):  
Gry Oftedal ◽  
Ingrid H. Ravn ◽  
Fredrik A. Dahl

We tested whether responses to trolley problems by nurse specialist students correlated with their responses to hypothetical vaccine problems, as a follow-up to a similar study on ethics committees. No statistically significant correlation was found between the trolley and vaccination scores. These results confirmed and strengthened the finding of a very weak correlation (possibly zero), and the point estimate was even lower than for the ethics committees. Hence, the nurse specialists’ responses to the trolley problems cannot be used to indicate any direction for their responses to the vaccine problems, although there is a common core issue of sacrificing some for many. The respondents reported a relatively high willingness to push one man in front of a trolley to save five. They also reported a high willingness to act in trolley dilemmas compared with vaccination dilemmas, although the dimensions of risk–reward ratios and consent heavily favored the latter.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1386-1388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Colman ◽  
Natalie Gold ◽  
Briony D. Pulford
Keyword(s):  

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249345
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Winking ◽  
Jeremy Koster

Researchers often use moral dilemmas to investigate the specific factors that influence participants’ judgments of the appropriateness of different actions. A common construction of such a dilemma is the Trolley Problem, which pits an obvious utilitarian solution against a common deontological dictum to not do harm to others. Cross-cultural studies have validated the robustness of numerous contextual biases, such as judging utilitarian decisions more negatively if they require contact with other individuals (contact bias), they force others to serve as a means to an end (means bias), and if they require direct action rather than inaction (omission bias). However, such cross-cultural research is largely limited to studies of industrialized, nation-state populations. Previous research has suggested that the more intimate community relationships that characterize small-scale populations might lead to important differences, such as an absence of an omission bias. Here we contribute to this literature by investigating perceptions of Trolley Problem solutions among a Mayangna/Miskito community, a small-scale indigenous population in Nicaragua. Compared to previously sampled populations, the Mayangna/Miskito participants report higher levels of acceptance of utilitarian solutions and do not exhibit an omission bias. We also examine the justifications participants offered to explore how Mayangna/Miskito culture might influence moral judgments.


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