moral heuristics or moral competence? reflections on sunstein

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
john mikhail
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Moral Competence ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Performance Errors ◽  
Trolley Problems

by focusing on mistaken judgments, sunstein provides a theory of performance errors without a theory of moral competence. additionally, sunstein's objections to thought experiments like the footbridge and trolley problems are unsound. exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences, and these problems enable us to uncover the implicit structure of our moral intuitions.

scholarly journals YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: COMPARING JUDGEMENTS IN TROLLEY PROBLEMS INVOLVING ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL HARMS, INJURY AND DEATH

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Gold ◽  
Briony D. Pulford ◽  
Andrew M. Colman
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Standard Pattern ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Trolley Problems

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms.

scholarly journals What Is Moral Competence and Why Promote It?

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewa Nowak
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Review Paper ◽  
Short Review ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Competence ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Self Reflection

This short review paper focuses on Georg Lind's approach to the moral competence as described in his recent book (2016) How To Teach Morality? Promoting Deliberation and Discussion, Reducing Violence and Deceit. Berlin: Logos Verlag. Lind's dual-aspect approach is discussed as one of the leading conceptions of personal moral competence and moral cognition today. Intuitionist approach and "embodied cognition" are not enough, the author (E. Nowak) claims. As participants of social contexts and institutions, we need manifest, discoursively articulated reflection, self-reflection, and conversation. However, Lind's hypothesis of two leyers of morality, i.e., a conscious and unconscious finds evidence in cognitive sciences too. Lind's approach is not as reductionist as that of radical cognitivists. On the contrary, it combines all relevant aspects of moral cognition discussed right now, worldwide – when cognitive sciences flourish and the challenges for moral mind grow up dramatically.    

scholarly journals Relations among psychopathy, moral competence, and moral intuitions in student and community samples

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Jeremy G. Gay ◽  
Michael J. Vitacco ◽  
Amy Hackney ◽  
Courtney Beussink ◽  
Scott O. Lilienfeld
Keyword(s):  
Moral Competence ◽  
Moral Intuitions

Folk-economic beliefs as moral intuitions

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Malhotra
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

AbstractAlthough Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.

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