scholarly journals Short selling and exchange-traded funds returns: evidence from the London Stock Exchange

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azhar Mohamad ◽  
Aziz Jaafar ◽  
John Goddard
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Durston

Purpose This paper aims to consider “spoofing”, “layering” and “short reports” in the context of market manipulation and, in particular, a recent controversy involving a short-selling attack on a major UK listed company that was considered by the High Court. Design/methodology/approach The very demanding legal and evidential prerequisites and practical difficulties, involved in bringing both criminal and regulatory actions in such cases are identified and discussed, as is the role of the Financial Conduct Authority. Findings These challenges help explain why so few actions of this type are brought. Originality/value This is the first paper to consider the implications of Burford Capital Limited v London Stock Exchange Plc [2020] EWHC 1183 (Comm).


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (13) ◽  
pp. 111-137
Author(s):  
د. أحمد بن هلال الشيخ د. أحمد بن هلال الشيخ

Research Subject: short-selling and its applications on the Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange. Fiqhi Authentication study Research Objectives: - Clarifying the short-selling and its applications on the Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange. - Alternatives to Short-selling Research Methodology: Analytical Descriptive. The most important findings. There is a distinction between naked short-selling – the selling of stocks that the person “does not own” or without first obtaining approval for borrowing them – and the regular short-selling where an investor sells stocks borrowed from its owner and return them back later after a certain time – covered shorting. Regular short-selling is a combined contract of sale and loan transactions, where the loan is set against a certain dividends to the borrower to be paid to the broker. There is a number of alternatives to short-selling such as: put options and inverse exchange-traded funds.


Author(s):  
Leslie Hannah

Historians have struggled to explain how stock markets could develop—with notable vigour in many countries before 1914—before modern shareholder protections were legally mandated. Trust networks among local elites—and/or information signalling to public investors—substituted for legal regulation, but this chapter suggests real limits to such processes. They are especially implausible when applied to giant companies with ownership substantially divorced from control, of which there were many with—nationally and internationally—dispersed shareholdings. In London—the largest pre-1914 securities market—strong supplementary supports for market development were provided by mandatory requirements for transparency and anti-director rights in UK statutory companies and by low new issue fees. There were also stringent London Stock Exchange requirements for other companies wanting the liquidity benefits of official listing. Shareholder rights were similarly achieved in Brazil and other countries and colonies dependent on British capital.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document