scholarly journals Motivating and defending the phenomenological conception of perceptual justification

Inquiry ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Philipp Berghofer
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Phenomenological Conception

The Evidence of the Senses is no Evidence from the Senses

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Tommaso Piazza
Keyword(s):  
Logical Investigation ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Recent Interpretation

In the first part of this paper I suggest that Dogmatism about perceptual justification – the view that in the most basic cases, perceptual justification is immediate – commits to rejecting Evidentialism, as it commits, specifically, to accounting for the mechanics of perceptual justification otherwise than by maintaining that perceptual experiences justify by providing evidence. In the second part of the paper, by following W. Hopp’s recent interpretation of Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of fulfilment provides the basis of the non-evidential account of the mechanics of perceptual justification needed to vindicate Dogmatism.

Phenomenology and Beyond

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Inkpin
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Conception

This chapter considers what kind of explanatory approach is best suited to complement a minimalist phenomenological conception of language. It argues that two more ambitious forms of phenomenology – Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology – both result in tension with the commitment to describe experience accurately, and that ‘4e’ cognitive science focusing on the embodied, embedded, enacted and extended nature of cognition is a better option. In support of this claim it considers the roles of ‘scaffolds’ and action-oriented representation in 4e cognitive science to highlight key commitments shared with a phenomenological conception of language. Finally, it argues that a minimalist phenomenology of language cannot simply be eliminated in favor of 4e cognitive science, as might be suspected, and that the two approaches should be thought of as complementary and mutually illuminating.

The World Disclosed

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Inkpin
Keyword(s):  
Being And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Loss Of Contact ◽  
Phenomenological Conception ◽  
The Way

This chapter clarifies the sense of world disclosure implied by a phenomenological conception of language. It takes the two main lessons of Heidegger’s discussion of realism and idealism in Being and Time to be that traditional debates are based on mistaken ontological presuppositions, and that there is no gap between the way the world appears ‘for us’ and the way it is ‘in itself’. Applying the second lesson to language, it shows how the mediation and constitutive role of language can be understood as genuinely disclosing the world without introducing a potentially refractive or distortive loss of contact with referents. Applying the first lesson, it contrasts the phenomenological conception of language developed here with some familiar forms of realism and nonrealism, arguing that by rejecting an inside-outside opposition it moves beyond such conventional alternatives.

Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

scholarly journals Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Berghofer
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Learning ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Phenomenological Conception

AbstractHusserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.

scholarly journals Entitlement, Epistemic Risk, and Scepticism

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Epistemic Risk

AbstractCrispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn't elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright's contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don't remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don't actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright's responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi's argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright couldn't answer Moruzzi's challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification.

Replies to Commentators

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.

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