Phenomenology and Beyond

Author(s):  
Andrew Inkpin

This chapter considers what kind of explanatory approach is best suited to complement a minimalist phenomenological conception of language. It argues that two more ambitious forms of phenomenology – Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology – both result in tension with the commitment to describe experience accurately, and that ‘4e’ cognitive science focusing on the embodied, embedded, enacted and extended nature of cognition is a better option. In support of this claim it considers the roles of ‘scaffolds’ and action-oriented representation in 4e cognitive science to highlight key commitments shared with a phenomenological conception of language. Finally, it argues that a minimalist phenomenology of language cannot simply be eliminated in favor of 4e cognitive science, as might be suspected, and that the two approaches should be thought of as complementary and mutually illuminating.

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Berghofer

AbstractHusserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.


2016 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 194-205
Author(s):  
Jesús A. Escudero ◽  

The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a commonplace in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection and transcendental phenomenology. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. Based on the complex development process of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in the course of his early lectures in Freiburg, the present paper weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Martirano

<p>When marketing researchers select their methodology, two main choices are open to them: qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative has long been associated with scientific, empirical research based on statistics and numerical comparisons, considered by some marketing analysts to be objective and empirical. Qualitative methods are favored for “soft” social science and humanities research as a means to explore human opinions and perceptions through first-hand experience. Thus there has been a longstanding problem of pursuing qualitative research that is considered as free from bias and accurate as its quantitative counterpart. One philosopher who set out to imbue qualitative methodology with the same credibility given quantitative was Edmund Husserl, an early 1900s German philosopher. He developed transcendental phenomenology as a methodology that could explore experiences with the same objectivity as quantitative styles via surpassing the preconceptions of the researcher through use of a primordial fugue state called epoché. Although researcher would use qualitative tools such as interviews and questionnaires, inquiries would be formulated and analyzed free from preconceptions and bias, processed via bracketing of the most common responses. Husserl’s writings were hard to decipher and not as readily adapted to research as other qualitative methods, including hermeneutic phenomenology, which includes researcher input. Nevertheless, if used properly, even for such unlikely-seeming research projects as those dealing with marketing, transcendental phenomenology can produce valid and reliable results yielding valuable information for philosophical purists capable of rigor and discipline.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.


2003 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 745-748 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mahoney
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (9) ◽  
pp. 839-840
Author(s):  
James S. Uleman

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 692-693
Author(s):  
Keith Rayner
Keyword(s):  

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 493-494
Author(s):  
Jane Grimshaw
Keyword(s):  

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