Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap'

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Natural Explanation ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
The One ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson (1982), (1986); Levine (1983), (1993), (2001); McGinn (1991); Sturgeon (1994), (2000); Chalmers (1996), (1999). Some of these writers claim that the existence of such a gap would warrant a belief in some form of ontological dualism (Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 1996), whereas others argue that no such entailment holds (Levine, 1983; McGinn, 1991; Sturgeon, 1994). In the other main camp, there are people who argue that a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is possible in principle (Block and Stalnaker, 1999), and yet others who claim, moreover, to have provided such an explanation in practice (Dennett, 1991; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995,2000; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000).

Two conceptions of access-consciousness

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-147
Author(s):  
Derek Browne
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Intuitive Idea ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.

Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Champagne
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Qualitative Dimension

ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability toprescindqualities from occurrences.

Explaining the “hard” problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 116-139
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Phenomenal Concepts ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Global Workspace Theory

This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable and an (epistemic) explanatory gap is opened up. But the thoughts in question can themselves be given a fully naturalistic explanation. Hence all of the facts involved in consciousness can be fully explained. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed to make this account work, and replies to a dilemma for the account proposed by David Chalmers.

Consciousness as action: The eliminativist sirens are calling

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 990-991
Author(s):  
Martin Kurthen
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Sensorimotor Theory ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

The sensorimotor theory of vision successfully blends in with the currently developing action-oriented account of cognition. As a theory of phenomenal consciousness, however, it suffers from the same shortcomings as the theories O'Regan & Noë (O&N) criticize. This is mainly due to the failure to avoid the explanatory gap by rejecting one notion of qualia while retaining the concept of experience with qualitative features in general.

Reductionism and qualia

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Sanela Ristic
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
Conceptual Frame ◽  
Scientific Reduction ◽  
Successful Science

The main purpose of this article is to face the following dilemma: either qualia (phenomenological or qualitative features of consciousness) constitute a permanent and irremovable barrier to the possibility of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, or there are possibility of speaking about the subjective consciousness in the conceptual frame of one successful science. In order to deal with this dilemma we are going to examine a justification of the traditional tendency to approach the qualia as having the specific epistemological, semantic and ontological status. Also, we are going to examine the most convincible arguments for this thesis. It will be suggested the general theory of scientific reduction with the specific attention to the case of reduction of mental to the physical. In view of the fact that all attempts to prove the "exceptionality" of qualia, in relation to the paradigmatic examples of successfully reductions in science, didn't succeed, we are going to argue that psycho-physical reduction is feasible and that there are no reasons for making the explanatory standards in the case of consciousness stronger then they are in the other cases.

Functionalism and qualia

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Zivan Lazovic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Current State ◽  
Specific Proposal ◽  
Brain States ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Functionalist Approach ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
In Virtue Of

The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causal role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property.

Schelling und der Selbstrepräsentationalismus über phänomenales Bewusstsein

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Lang
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Systematic Importance

AbstractThis paper explores Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness in the System of Transcendental Idealism. It is shown that Schelling’s description and explanation of phenomenal consciousness is in accord with contemporary self-representationalist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, it is argued that Schelling develops a self-representationalist approach of phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, it is demonstrated on the basis of Schelling’s account that analytic self-representationalism fails to completely explain phenomenal consciousness. Finally, however, a fundamental critique of Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Thus the central theses of the paper are, on the one hand, that Schelling is of systematic importance for contemporary debates, on the other hand, that his account is not convincing.

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