Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Champagne
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Qualitative Dimension

ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability toprescindqualities from occurrences.

scholarly journals Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępień
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Body ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.

Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap'

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Natural Explanation ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
The One ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson (1982), (1986); Levine (1983), (1993), (2001); McGinn (1991); Sturgeon (1994), (2000); Chalmers (1996), (1999). Some of these writers claim that the existence of such a gap would warrant a belief in some form of ontological dualism (Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 1996), whereas others argue that no such entailment holds (Levine, 1983; McGinn, 1991; Sturgeon, 1994). In the other main camp, there are people who argue that a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is possible in principle (Block and Stalnaker, 1999), and yet others who claim, moreover, to have provided such an explanation in practice (Dennett, 1991; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995,2000; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000).

scholarly journals Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Multiple Realizability ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Conceivability Arguments ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Methodological Reflection

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

Consciousness as action: The eliminativist sirens are calling

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 990-991
Author(s):  
Martin Kurthen
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Sensorimotor Theory ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

The sensorimotor theory of vision successfully blends in with the currently developing action-oriented account of cognition. As a theory of phenomenal consciousness, however, it suffers from the same shortcomings as the theories O'Regan & Noë (O&N) criticize. This is mainly due to the failure to avoid the explanatory gap by rejecting one notion of qualia while retaining the concept of experience with qualitative features in general.

Functionalism and qualia

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Zivan Lazovic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Current State ◽  
Specific Proposal ◽  
Brain States ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Functionalist Approach ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
In Virtue Of

The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causal role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property.

Russellian Monism and Epistemic Pessimism

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Other Minds Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Russellian Monism

AbstractRussellian monism is any view that proposes that we cannot solve the mind-body problem because natural science cannot tell us about the aspects of physical reality that are necessary to know to explain consciousness. I argue that Russellian monism should be combined with the Heil-Martin theory about dispositions. However, this combination becomes a theory with some profound epistemic pessimistic consequences, namely that we cannot bridge the explanatory gap between physical and conscious states and that we cannot solve the other minds problem. However, this epistemic pessimism does not constitute an unacceptable kind of “mystery-mongering” because we can also find analogous results in the well-established sciences. This may make it easier to accept Russellian monism’s epistemic pessimism.

scholarly journals God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts

Philosophy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Christofidou
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Distinct Entity ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Absolute Conception ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Completeness Of Physics

AbstractThe paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the ‘explanatory gap’ is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity.

The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Boltuc ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
First Person ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Machine Consciousness ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Reductive Naturalism

I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered.

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