Risk, rationality and expected utility theory
2015 ◽
Vol 45
(5-6)
◽
pp. 798-826
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Keyword(s):
There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory. I will show that the orthodoxy can be made to accommodate all of the preferences that Buchak’s theory can accommodate.
2019 ◽
Vol 27
(1)
◽
pp. 36-50
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Keyword(s):
1997 ◽
Vol 45
(2)
◽
pp. 307-328
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1996 ◽
Vol 12
(2)
◽
pp. 165-182
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1982 ◽
Vol 14
(5)
◽
pp. 681-698
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Keyword(s):