scholarly journals The reversal test, status quo bias, and opposition to human cognitive enhancement

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Clarke

AbstractBostrom and Ord’s reversal test has been appealed to by many philosophers to substantiate the charge that preferences for status quo options are motivated by status quo bias. I argue that their characterization of the reversal test needs to be modified, and that their description of the burden of proof it imposes needs to be clarified. I then argue that there is a way to meet that burden of proof which Bostrom and Ord fail to recognize. I also argue that the range of circumstances in which the reversal test can be usefully applied is narrower than they recognize.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alice Monro

<p>In this thesis I argue against the use of genetic technologies to enhance human cognitive capacities. More specifically, I respond to Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord's "Reversal Test", which they use to argue in favour of genetic cognitive enhancement. The Reversal Test is a burden of proof challenge designed to diagnose status quo bias in arguments against enhancement. By noting that most of those who oppose raisingintelligence would also oppose lowering intelligence, the Reversal Test puts the onuson opponents of enhancement to explain why both increases and decreases in our cognitive capacity would be worse than the status quo (our current level of intelligence). Bostrom and Ord claim that if no good reasons can be provided, this indicates that the opposition to enhancement is influenced by status quo bias. Since cognitive biases cannot provide a moral reason against enhancement, opposition to genetic cognitive enhancement shown to be affected by status quo bias canaccordingly be discounted. The aim of my thesis, then, is to overcome the Reversal Test' s burden of proof challenge by showing that my reasons for opposing cognitive enhancement are notinfluenced by status quo bias. However, I do not argue that enhanced intelligence could not be beneficial to the individual. Instead, I claim that the probable unequal distribution of enhancements between the best- and worst-off would be likely to cause serious injustices to those who are unable to afford them.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alice Monro

<p>In this thesis I argue against the use of genetic technologies to enhance human cognitive capacities. More specifically, I respond to Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord's "Reversal Test", which they use to argue in favour of genetic cognitive enhancement. The Reversal Test is a burden of proof challenge designed to diagnose status quo bias in arguments against enhancement. By noting that most of those who oppose raisingintelligence would also oppose lowering intelligence, the Reversal Test puts the onuson opponents of enhancement to explain why both increases and decreases in our cognitive capacity would be worse than the status quo (our current level of intelligence). Bostrom and Ord claim that if no good reasons can be provided, this indicates that the opposition to enhancement is influenced by status quo bias. Since cognitive biases cannot provide a moral reason against enhancement, opposition to genetic cognitive enhancement shown to be affected by status quo bias canaccordingly be discounted. The aim of my thesis, then, is to overcome the Reversal Test' s burden of proof challenge by showing that my reasons for opposing cognitive enhancement are notinfluenced by status quo bias. However, I do not argue that enhanced intelligence could not be beneficial to the individual. Instead, I claim that the probable unequal distribution of enhancements between the best- and worst-off would be likely to cause serious injustices to those who are unable to afford them.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Somdeb Lahiri

In this paper we provide a reader friendly axiomatic characterization of the default bias extended choice rule, in the framework available in lecture 3 of Rubinstein (2016) . As noted there “experimental evidence and introspection tell us that a default option is often viewed positively by a decision maker, a phenomenon known as the status quo bias”. A different axiomatic characterization of the extended choice rule is available in that lecture. Our proof makes use of the Szpilrajn's extension which for finite sets (as in our case) has a very simple proof. JEL Classification: D01, D03


Ethics ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 116 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Bostrom ◽  
Toby Ord

Author(s):  
Andrea Morone ◽  
Rocco Caferra ◽  
Alessia Casamassima ◽  
Alessandro Cascavilla ◽  
Paola Tiranzoni

AbstractThis work aims to identify and quantify the biases behind the anomalous behavior of people when they deal with the Three Doors dilemma, which is a really simple but counterintuitive game. Carrying out an artefactual field experiment and proposing eight different treatments to isolate the anomalies, we provide new interesting experimental evidence on the reasons why subjects fail to take the optimal decision. According to the experimental results, we are able to quantify the size and the impact of three main biases that explain the anomalous behavior of participants: Bayesian updating, illusion of control and status quo bias.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Rubaltelli ◽  
Sandro Rubichi ◽  
Lucia Savadori ◽  
Marcello Tedeschi ◽  
Riccardo Ferretti

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