John R. Bruning,Battle for the North Atlantic: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 929-932
Author(s):  
Peter Scott Roberts
2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Błazejcżyk

AbstractAnalysis of the consequences of power balance disturbance in the Central-Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and regaining sovereignty by states remaining under the dominance of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics after World War II leads to recognizing Poland's accession to NATO as Poland's indisputable diplomatic success providing it with a new instrument serving to implement its


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Kaplan

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, gave rise to a number of books and articles on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the volume of which will probably continue for some time. The treaty and the organization that it created represent the clearest challenge to Soviet expansionism since the end of World War II. Through this action twelve nations of North America and western Europe resolved to consider an armed attack against one member an attack against them all, and to create sufficient stiength within the alliance to deter potential aggressors. But NATO's continuing interest to commentators stems from reasons other than its value as a weapon against the spread of communism. To some writers NATO appears to be a stimulant that would revive a moribund United Nations, to others it is the beginning of a new kind of alliance unprecedented in history, to still others, it is a symbol of America's rejection of isolationism. So vague are some of the treaty's articles and so rapid has been the evolution of the organization that almost any observer could derive whatever meaning he wishes out of NATO's development.


Polar Record ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Fog Jensen ◽  
Tilo Krause

ABSTRACTAs the axis powers were denied access to data from international weather stations under allied control, soon after the outbreak of World War II Germany had to establish her own network of manned and automatic weather stations throughout the north Atlantic. These operations were primarily run by the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe. In Greenland, several manned weather stations were established by the former. The two most successful of those were Holzauge and Bassgeiger in Northeast Greenland, each in operation for almost an entire year in 1942–1943 and 1943–1944 respectively. The allied forces, in return, had established the North-East Greenland Sledge Patrol in 1941, in order to defend the Northeast Greenland coast against German activities. In 2007 and 2008, archaeologists and historians from the National Museum of Denmark investigated the remains of the allied station at Eskimonæs on Clavering Ø (Clavering Island) and the German station Holzauge at Hansa Bugt on Sabine Ø (Sabine Island).


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 860-871
Author(s):  
Richard J. Kerry

World War II taught Norway that she was dependent on international organization for her security. When it became evident to her that the UN, in which she had originally placed such high hopes, could not meet her needs on this score, she began exploring the possibilities of regional organization. After the failure of the negotiations for some kind of Scandinavian arrangement, or the decision not to enter into such an arrangement, forward-looking elements, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, turned their attention to the regional collective security organization which was ultimately established by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 31-34
Author(s):  
Michael Doyle

Peacekeeping, human rights, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have flourished in complementary contrast with each other. Their relationship has reflected the constraints and opportunities provided by three geopolitical eras since World War II. The first (the first Cold War) began in about 1948 and lasted until 1988; the second (the Post-Cold War Liberal Primacy) ran from 1989 to around 2012; finally, since 2012 the world has been threatened with the emergence of a second Cold War.


2021 ◽  
Vol 02 (06) ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
R.R. Marchenkov ◽  

This article highlights the main milestones of Anglo-American coalition cooperation during the Second World War. The military-political aspect of cooperation is touched upon. An approach to the fusion of military mechanisms through the development of the idea of the qualitative use of the forces and means of the allies in compliance with the principle of unity of command is considered. It is concluded that certain fruits of cooperation between the Western allies, primarily within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are taken into account in the post-war world. In addition, this article focuses on the position of the United Kingdom in terms of building a post-war security system.


Author(s):  
Marcus Faulkner

In the vast literature concerning the German attack on Allied maritime communications in the Atlantic theater during the Second World War, one particular factor has received little to no consideration – the potential threat that German aircraft carriers posed to Allied naval operations and the passage of maritime traffic in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. While ultimately the Kriegmarine never fielded an operational carrier, such a development could not be discounted at the time. This chapter addresses what the British knew about the German effort and what implications this had on British strategy, naval planning, and fleet deployments. In covering these aspects, this chapter by Marcus Faulkner fills an existing gap concerning the Admiralty's perception and contributes to understanding the complexity of the maritime threat Britain faced during the war. It also illustrates the problems involved in evaluating enemy military capabilities and intentions on the basis of a very limited intelligence picture. This in turn helps historians understand why the Admiralty remained so apprehensive of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet until 1943.


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