The paper indicates how an original Fleckian core of Wojciech Sady’s methodology significantly weakens some popular presentations of the history of empirical sciences (especially the so-called scientific revolutions), which are founded on a myth of a ‘lonely genius’ and ‘miraculous ideas’. Sady rightly emphasizes the collective-cognitive character of processes shaping the theoretical breakthroughs in physics, however he unnecessarily contends that there is some determinism behind them. In order to understand their dynamics, one needs the fine-grained historical-sociological analyses concerning the factors which regulate the work of the research collectives (also the early modern ones), but the widespread individualistic myths make that task much harder, even in a field of critical philosophy of science. It is suggested that the Fleckian perspective is also quite crucial in explaining the seemingly paradoxical waves of antiscientific sentiments which are clearly visible in the hypertechnological societies.
Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs, and Waterbears