scholarly journals Bez geniuszów, bez cudów — w kolektywie. Głos w dyskusji nad nową książką Wojciecha Sadego

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-49
Author(s):  
Marek Woszczek

The paper indicates how an original Fleckian core of Wojciech Sady’s methodology significantly weakens some popular presentations of the history of empirical sciences (especially the so-called scientific revolutions), which are founded on a myth of a ‘lonely genius’ and ‘miraculous ideas’. Sady rightly emphasizes the collective-cognitive character of processes shaping the theoretical breakthroughs in physics, however he unnecessarily contends that there is some determinism behind them. In order to understand their dynamics, one needs the fine-grained historical-sociological analyses concerning the factors which regulate the work of the research collectives (also the early modern ones), but the widespread individualistic myths make that task much harder, even in a field of critical philosophy of science. It is suggested that the Fleckian perspective is also quite crucial in explaining the seemingly paradoxical waves of antiscientific sentiments which are clearly visible in the hypertechnological societies.

Author(s):  
Georgy S. Levit ◽  
◽  
Uwe Hossfeld ◽  

Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in the 19th century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwinian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.


TEME ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 845
Author(s):  
Katarina Tomašević ◽  
Sanela D Andrić ◽  
Srđan M Milašinović

Kun’s The structure of the scientific revolutions triggered the avalanche of criticism and represents the most conducive and most critical work of the sixties until the eighties of the twentieth century in which the problems of understanding scientific knowledge are discussed. The development of science was understood as a gradual process during which the stages of normal science and scientific revolutions are being shifted. Boldly, by introducing new concepts in the history of philosophy of science, he has received many opponents, but also many followers. In this paper, we tried to present Kun's understanding of the progress in the science and criticism of his greatest opponents, with a reference to the scientific revolutions in social sciences. We also tried to answer the question of whether the scientific revolutions have been depleted and what is happening with the objectivity of science.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen

Abstract Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a classic, and it is certainly not forgotten. However, an essential aspect about it has been neglected. That is, Kuhn’s Structure is a book in philosophy of history in the sense that Structure attempts gives an account of historical events, focuses on the whole of the history of science and stipulates a structure of the history of science to explain historical events. Kuhn’s book and its contribution to the debates about the progress of science and the contingency and inevitability of the history of science shows why and how philosophy of history is relevant for the history and philosophy of science. Its successful integration of historical and philosophical aspects in one account makes it worthwhile reading also for philosophers of history in the twentieth-first century. In particular, it raises the question whether the historical record can justify philosophical views and comprehensive syntheses of the past.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-185
Author(s):  
Vladislav A. Shaposhnikov ◽  

The paper deals with some conceptual trends in the philosophy of science of the 1980‒90s, which being evolved simultaneously with the computer revolution, make room for treating it as a revolution in mathematics. The immense and widespread popularity of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions had made a demand for overcoming this theory, at least in some aspects, just inevitable. Two of such aspects are brought into focus in this paper. Firstly, it is the shift from theoretical to instrumental revolutions which are sometimes called “Galisonian revolutions” after Peter Galison. Secondly, it is the shift from local (“little”) to global (“big”) scientific revolutions now connected with the name of Ian Hacking; such global, transdisciplinary revolutions are at times called “Hacking-type revolutions”. The computer revolution provides a typical example of both global and instrumental revolutions. That change of accents in the post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific revolutions was closely correlated with the general tendency to treat science as far more pluralistic and transdisciplinary. That tendency is primarily associated with the so-called Stanford School; Peter Galison and Ian Hacking are often seen as its representatives. In particular, that new image of science gave no support to a clear-cut separation of mathematics from other sciences. Moreover, it has formed prerequisites for the recognition of material and technical revolutions in the history of mathematics. Especially, the computer revolution can be considered in the new framework as a revolution in mathematics par excellence.


2001 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Lennox

In the aftermath of Thomas Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions, there was a great deal of discussion about the relationship between the History of Science and the Philosophy of Science. A wider issue was at stake in these discussions: 'normativism' versus 'naturalism' in Epistemology. If the History of Science, at best, gives us reliable information about what actually occurred historically, how can it inform debates about such things as confirmation or explanation in Philosophy of Science? This essay makes a case for the centrality of historical investigation in the Philosophy of Science. I will defend what I term the 'Phylogenetic' approach to the Philosophy of Science. I will argue that since the foundations and dominant methods of a particular scientific field are shaped by its history, studying that History can give us considerable insight into conceptual and methodological problems in a particular Science. The case will be made both on general, philosophical grounds, and by compelling instantiation.


1975 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert G. Reid ◽  
Ernest J. Yanarella

It is by now a commonplace among American political scientists that the philosophical grounding of political inquiry is in dire need of critical reflection and serious repair, if not radical reconstruction. The sources of this widespread recognition are no doubt diverse, but not the least resides in the impact of the key ideas of Thomas Kuhn's celebrated work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For, although Kuhn's work was narrowly interpreted by Almond, Truman, and other key figures in the behavioral elite corps to conform to their image of science (basically a naive positivist image), the very breadth and subtlety of Kuhn's work, his commitment to formulating his conception of science from the history of science as practiced, and his ultimate antagonism to that tradition of the philosophy of science (logical positivism/empiricism) which behavioralists have embraced ensured that a lively and contentious debate would ensue.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-79
Author(s):  
Sara Zandi Karimi

This article is a critical translation of the “History of the Ardalānids.” In doing so, it hopes to make available to a wider academic audience this invaluable source on the study of Iranian Kurdistan during the early modern period. While a number of important texts pertaining to the Kurds during this era, most notably the writings of the Ottoman traveler Evliya Chalabi, focus primarily on Ottoman Kurdistan, this piece in contrast puts Iranian Kurdistan in general and the Ardalān dynasty in particular at the center of its historical narrative. Thus it will be of interest not only to scholars of Kurdish history but also to those seeking more generally to research life on the frontiers of empires.Keywords: Ẕayl; Ardalān; Kurdistan; Iran.ABSTRACT IN KURMANJIDîroka Erdelaniyan (1590-1810)Ev gotar wergereke rexneyî ya “Dîroka Erdelaniyan” e. Bi vê yekê, merema xebatê ew e ku vê çavkaniya pir biqîmet a li ser Kurdistana Îranê ya di serdema pêş-modern de ji bo cemawerê akademîk berdest bike. Hejmareke metnên girîng li ser Kurdên wê serdemê, bi taybetî nivîsînên Evliya Çelebî yê seyyahê osmanî, zêdetir berê xwe didine Kurdistana di bin hukmê Osmaniyan de. Lê belê, di navenda vê xebatê de, bi giştî Kurdistana Îranê û bi taybetî jî xanedana Erdelaniyan heye. Wisa jî ew dê ne tenê ji bo lêkolerên dîroka kurdî belku ji bo ewên ku dixwazin bi rengekî berfirehtir derheq jiyana li ser tixûbên împeretoriyan lêkolînan bikin jî dê balkêş be.ABSTRACT IN SORANIMêjûy Erdellan (1590-1810)Em wutare wergêrranêkî rexneyî “Mêjûy Erdellan”e, bew mebestey em serçawe girînge le ser Kurdistanî Êran le seretakanî serdemî nwê bixate berdest cemawerî ekademî. Jimareyek serçawey girîng le ser kurdekan lew serdeme da hen, diyartirînyan nûsînekanî gerîdey ‘Usmanî Ewliya Çelebîye, ke zortir serincyan le ser ‘Kurdistanî ‘Usmanî bûwe. Em berheme be pêçewanewe Kurdistanî Êran be giştî, we emaretî Erdelan be taybetî dexate senterî xwêndinewekewe. Boye nek tenya bo twêjeranî biwarî mêjûy kurdî, belku bo ewaney le ser jiyan le sinûre împiratoriyekan twêjînewe deken, cêgay serinc debêt.


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