6. Kant’s Critical Philosophy of Science

In this study an attempt will he made to discuss the epistemological problems in the theory and practice of modern technical medicine in the writings of Hermann von Helmholtz. An inquiry into the relationship between von Helmholtz? thinking and the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant is followed by the characteristics of von Helmholtz’ philosophy of science which he himself called “empirical theory”. The question of medicine as a science finally leads to the main problem of medical epistemology, viz., the relationship between theoretical knowledge and practice in medicine. In this context the anthropological dimension is brought into consideration.

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Bez geniuszów, bez cudów — w kolektywie. Głos w dyskusji nad nową książką Wojciecha Sadego

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia ◽

10.19195/1895-8001.16.3.5 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 41-49

Author(s):

Marek Woszczek

Keyword(s):

Early Modern ◽

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Critical Philosophy ◽

Fine Grained ◽

Scientific Revolutions ◽

History Of

The paper indicates how an original Fleckian core of Wojciech Sady’s methodology significantly weakens some popular presentations of the history of empirical sciences (especially the so-called scientific revolutions), which are founded on a myth of a ‘lonely genius’ and ‘miraculous ideas’. Sady rightly emphasizes the collective-cognitive character of processes shaping the theoretical breakthroughs in physics, however he unnecessarily contends that there is some determinism behind them. In order to understand their dynamics, one needs the fine-grained historical-sociological analyses concerning the factors which regulate the work of the research collectives (also the early modern ones), but the widespread individualistic myths make that task much harder, even in a field of critical philosophy of science. It is suggested that the Fleckian perspective is also quite crucial in explaining the seemingly paradoxical waves of antiscientific sentiments which are clearly visible in the hypertechnological societies.

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Keynes, Kuhn and the sociology of knowledge: a comment on Pernecky and Wojick

Cambridge Journal of Economics ◽

10.1093/cje/beaa016 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 44 (6) ◽

pp. 1415-1424 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Rod Thomas

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Sociology Of Knowledge ◽

Critical Philosophy ◽

Critical Rationalism ◽

Knowledge Function ◽

Philosophy Of Knowledge

Abstract Mark Pernecky and Paul Wojick use T.S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science to diagnose The problematic nature and consequences of the effort to force Keynes into the conceptual cul-de-sac of Walrasian economics. But their diagnosis is itself problematical in nature and consequence. It assumes the virtues of a pre-Kuhnian philosophy of knowledge that the Kuhnian meta-framework overtly discards. One way to eliminate the inconsistency is to recognise that Kuhn’s philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge function to immunise theories from criticism. Anyone who wishes to embrace a sociologically more critical philosophy ought to consider instead the philosophical attitude of critical rationalism.

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