Is the Larosière Proposal on European Financial Regulation on the Right Path?

2010 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Onado
Author(s):  
Mccormick Roger ◽  
Stears Chris

This chapter discusses the various laws, regulations, and comparable measures that were passed or proposed in response to the financial crisis in the EU and elsewhere. It covers the responses of the de Larosière Report, G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board. The de Larosière Report, for instance, was commissioned by the President of the European Commission in October 2008 and delivered on 25 February 2009. The report sought ‘to give advice on the future of European financial regulation and supervision’ and has formed the basis of many of the responses to the financial crisis at EU level. The G20 issued a comprehensive communiqué on the crisis at the London ‘Summit’ of 2 April 2009, covering a number of macro-economic and other ‘architectural’ issues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-395
Author(s):  
Petja Ivanova

Abstract In light of inevitable cross-border scenarios in today’s highly interconnected financial markets and since financial stability may be put at risk by the rising phenomenon of financial technology (known as fintech), the importance of developing effective ways to regulate fintech across borders cannot be neglected. The financial sector has changed from a traditional one marked by conventional financial intermediation structures towards an increasingly technology-affected one. Not only this change but anticipated developments too require if not extensively reconsidering the design of financial regulation,1 then at least not turning a blind eye to shaping developments. Whether the numerous recently sprouting bilateral fintech cooperation agreements are adequate transnational regulatory instruments to address fintech effectively across borders is for this paper to elucidate.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Lehmann

Abstract This article explores the reasons for legal fragmentation and extraterritoriality in the global regulation of finance. It shows that duplicative and overreaching rules are not necessarily the result of regulatory competition in which egoistic states undercut the rules of others in order to improve their position. An equally pivotal problem that global financial regulation has to cope with is uncertainty. Such uncertainty exists with regard to the right measures for achieving financial stability and with regard to the willingness and ability of other states to adopt them. The article analyses approaches to overcoming legal fragmentation while maintaining global financial stability. It suggests that there is no alternative to a collaborative approach, using intensified regulatory dialogue, a broadening of the information base and deference to other states’ rules. In order to improve the current mechanism, it proposes the introduction of multinational panels to assess whether regulatory and supervisory set-ups of two or more states lead to comparable outcomes, in which case they must be recognised as being ‘equivalent’ or ‘substituted compliant’.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document