scholarly journals controversy In The Evolution Of The World And European Financial Regulation

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (10) ◽  
pp. 279-285
Author(s):  
Olteanu Alexandru ◽  
Rădoi (Olteanu) Mădălina Antoaneta
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-104
Author(s):  
Insa Koch

Does anthropology matter to law? At first sight, this question might seem redundant: of course, anthropology matters to law, and it does so a great deal. Anthropologists have made important contributions to legal debates. Legal anthropology is a thriving sub-discipline, encompassing an ever-increasing range of topics, from long-standing concerns with customary law and legal culture to areas that have historically been left to lawyers, including corporate law and financial regulation. Anthropology’s relevance to law is also reflected in the world of legal practice. Some anthropologists act as cultural experts in, while others have challenged the workings of, particular legal regimes, including with respect to immigration law and social welfare.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 692-725
Author(s):  
Peter Krüger Andersen

The revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (the MiFID II regime)See Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) 600/2014 (MiFIR). is one of the most comprehensive reforms of market structural and investor protection regimes the world has yet seen. The MiFID II regime will affect the European – and likely the global – market structure for years to come. Based on relevant perspectives from the revised best execution regime under MiFID II, this article suggest that it is time to reduce complexity. It is argued that unless a sufficient degree of horizontal and vertical integration of the best execution regulation takes place, the policy objectives cannot be reached. Further, it is argued that the significant data exercise that comes with the new rules only serves end-investors if a sufficient level of data consistency can be achieved. From this outset, the article emphasises the increased importance of data in today’s EU financial regulation. The article includes relevant comparisons to the equivalent US rules on best execution.


Author(s):  
Tamara Makukh ◽  

The article analyses the main trends in the world economy through the prism of the current global financial and credit system. Various forecasts for the development of the world economy were assessed and noted that they do not correspond to real trends and patterns. These forecasts cannot assess the conceptual principles of the structure of the financial and credit base of the economy. Such forecasting is carried out on the principles of the achieved indicators and the developed methods of estimation of disturbances in the financial markets. The specificity of the state of the debt market is indicated, which allows to develop the economy only by increasing the total debt obligations, which leads to a complete loss of profitability of debt securities. It is proved that no defaults and debt write-offs do not renew the economy; these instruments only restart the mechanism of holding the debt market. Such development is a direct consequence of liberal regulation and a departure from the full functions of money, which leads to a conceptual change in the paradigm of the financial system. The limitations of the dominant concept of the financial and credit system, which was based on the basic foundations of the Bretton Woods Conference, were revealed. Criteria for financial regulation of a market economy have been identified and substantiated, which have exhausted their effectiveness and do not guarantee an early effect, but are only immediate. It is noted that the global pandemic and financial infusions to overcome it are a tool for accumulating total debt in the long run. The primary measures for debt restructuring are indicated, namely the support of low-debt fundamental companies that will meet the objective basic needs of innovative companies. Factors of economic development are explained: growth of economic productivity, short-term and long-term credit cycles and political component. It is indicated that productivity determines the priority of society's development in the long run, and the element of its implementation is knowledge in the absence of political dictate, which will form a new financial and credit mechanism. High-tech knowledge is needed to ensure productivity development, so investing in education and knowledge without different dogmas can bring the world economy to a new level of efficiency.


Author(s):  
R.S. Bilyk

These article is about the objective preconditions and regularities of conducting transformational changes in the economy of different countries of the world on innovative basis. It is substantiated, that the development of innovative modernization of the economy should be one of the main means system of state regulation itself. The experience of developed countries of the world had analyzed with regard to the use of financial methods and tools for activating innovation and conducting R & D. It substantiated, that the necessity of implementation of this experience in Ukraine in order to ensure modernization of the economy through introduction of various tax privileges, accelerated depreciation of fixed capital, cheap loans, etc.. It had proved, that the development and implementation of financial regulation methods in the mechanism of innovation modernization of the economy should take into account the features and structure of the domestic economy, the depth of globalization transformations and the degree of development of financial institutions. The focus of financial regulatory methods for modernizing the economy involves the concentration, distribution and redistribution of financial and economic resources, reorientation of the economy towards an innovative model of development. The priority directions had determined and recommendations had developed on improving the institutional foundations of financial policy in the context of innovative modernization of the Ukrainian economy. Among the most important areas are the following: the search for new sources and increase of financing of innovative development, improvement of the effectiveness of the influence of financial instruments on the rate of economic growth, the growth of the share of high-tech component of the economy, etc.


2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. F4-F9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
E. Phillip Davies

The financial crisis that engulfed the world in 2007 and 2008 has led to a wave of re-regulation and discussion of further regulation that has culminated in the proposals from the Basel Committee as well as those in the Vickers Committee report on Banking Regulation and Financial Crises. This issue of the Review contains a number of papers on Banking Regulation, covering many aspects of the debate, and we can put that debate in perspective through these papers and also by discussing our work on the relationship between bank size and risk taking, which is reported in Barrell et al. (2011). We addressed the causes of the crisis in the October 2008 Review, and began to look at the costs and benefits of bank regulation in Barrell et al. (2009). In that paper we argued that we needed to know the causes of crises and whether the regulators could do anything to affect them before we discussed new regulations. It is now generally agreed that increasing core capital reduces the probability of a crisis occurring, and most changes in regulation that are being discussed see this as the core of their toolkit. The work by the Institute macro team in Barrell et al. (2009) and in Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) was the first to demonstrate that there was a statistically important role for capital in defending against the probability of a crisis occurring, and our findings were widely used in the policy community in the debate over reform.


Author(s):  
Mccormick Roger ◽  
Stears Chris

This chapter discusses the various laws, regulations, and comparable measures that were passed or proposed in response to the financial crisis in the EU and elsewhere. It covers the responses of the de Larosière Report, G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board. The de Larosière Report, for instance, was commissioned by the President of the European Commission in October 2008 and delivered on 25 February 2009. The report sought ‘to give advice on the future of European financial regulation and supervision’ and has formed the basis of many of the responses to the financial crisis at EU level. The G20 issued a comprehensive communiqué on the crisis at the London ‘Summit’ of 2 April 2009, covering a number of macro-economic and other ‘architectural’ issues.


2010 ◽  
Vol 213 ◽  
pp. F39-F44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Dilruba Karim

The financial crisis that started in mid-2007 enveloped the world economy and caused a serious recession in most OECD countries. It is widely believed that it has also left a scar on potential output because it will have raised perceptions of risk and hence reduced the sustainable capital stock people wish to hold. It is inevitable that policymakers should ask what can be done to reduce the chances of this happening again, and it is equally inevitable that the banks would answer that it is too costly to do anything. There are four questions one must answer before it is possible to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of bank regulation. The first involves asking what are the costs of financial crises? The second involves asking what are the costs of financial regulation? The third involves asking what causes crises? The fourth, and perhaps the most important, involves asking whether regulators can do anything to reduce the risk of crises? Our overall approach to these issues is spelled out in a report written for the FSA in the aftermath of the crisis (see Barrell et al., 2009).


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H Cochrane

It's fun to pass judgment on waste, size, usefulness, complexity, and excessive compensation. But as economists, we have an analytical structure for thinking about these questions. “I don't understand it” doesn't mean “it's bad,” or “regulation will improve it.” That attitude pervades policy analysis in general and financial regulation in particular, and economists do the world a disservice if we echo it. I will not offer a competing black box [to explain the size of the finance industry]. I don't claim to estimate the socially optimal “size of finance” at, say, 8.267 percent of GDP. It's just the wrong question. Hayek and the failure of planning should teach us a little modesty: Pronouncing on socially optimal industry size is a waste of time. Is the finance industry functioning well? Are there identifiable market or government distortions? Will proposed regulations help or make matters worse? These are useful questions.


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