Carbon Forestry and Sociospatial Difference: An Examination of Two Carbon Offset Projects among Indigenous Smallholders in Costa Rica

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 593-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Lansing
2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Derong Lin ◽  
Yingzhi Lin

Climate change is one of the defining challenges facing the planet. Voluntary forest carbon offset project which has the potential to boost forest carbon storage and mitigate global warming has aroused the global concern. The objective of this paper is to model the game situation and analyze the game behaviors of stakeholders of voluntary forest carbon offset projects in China. A stakeholder model and a Power-Benefit Matrix are constructed to analyze the roles, behaviors, and conflicts of stakeholders including farmers, planting entities, communities, government, and China Green Carbon Foundation. The empirical analysis results show that although the stakeholders have diverse interests and different goals, a win-win solution is still possible through their joint participation and compromise in the voluntary forest carbon offset project. A wide governance structure laying emphasis on benefit balance, equality, and information exchanges and being regulated by all stakeholders has been constructed. It facilitates the agreement among the stakeholders with conflicting or different interests. The joint participation of stakeholders in voluntary forest carbon offset projects might change the government-dominated afforestation/reforestation into a market, where all participators including government are encouraged to cooperate with each other to improve the condition of fund shortage and low efficiency.


2014 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young-Hwan Kim ◽  
Eo-Jin Jeon ◽  
Man-Yong Shin ◽  
Il-Bin Chung ◽  
Sang-Tae Lee ◽  
...  

Forests ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Mustapha Alhassan ◽  
Marzieh Motallebi

Attracting forestland owners to participate in carbon markets can be challenging for several reasons including offset price volatility, legislative uncertainties, high costs of offset project development, long contract lengths, and landowners’ risk preferences. In this article, we elicit risk preferences and investigate Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) of forestland owners using an economic experiment. The economic experiment is a betting game and we find that forestland owners exhibit MLA because they bet higher when returns from their investments are evaluated less frequently. Our results provide valuable information for developing carbon market protocols, especially in setting optimal evaluation periods of forest carbon offset projects.


2009 ◽  
Vol 257 (11) ◽  
pp. 2209-2216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Galik ◽  
Robert B. Jackson

2019 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 463-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothée Herr ◽  
Juliet Blum ◽  
Amber Himes-Cornell ◽  
Ariana Sutton-Grier

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