scholarly journals Evaluating Myopic Loss Aversion of Forestland Owners

Forests ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Mustapha Alhassan ◽  
Marzieh Motallebi

Attracting forestland owners to participate in carbon markets can be challenging for several reasons including offset price volatility, legislative uncertainties, high costs of offset project development, long contract lengths, and landowners’ risk preferences. In this article, we elicit risk preferences and investigate Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) of forestland owners using an economic experiment. The economic experiment is a betting game and we find that forestland owners exhibit MLA because they bet higher when returns from their investments are evaluated less frequently. Our results provide valuable information for developing carbon market protocols, especially in setting optimal evaluation periods of forest carbon offset projects.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Derong Lin ◽  
Yingzhi Lin

Climate change is one of the defining challenges facing the planet. Voluntary forest carbon offset project which has the potential to boost forest carbon storage and mitigate global warming has aroused the global concern. The objective of this paper is to model the game situation and analyze the game behaviors of stakeholders of voluntary forest carbon offset projects in China. A stakeholder model and a Power-Benefit Matrix are constructed to analyze the roles, behaviors, and conflicts of stakeholders including farmers, planting entities, communities, government, and China Green Carbon Foundation. The empirical analysis results show that although the stakeholders have diverse interests and different goals, a win-win solution is still possible through their joint participation and compromise in the voluntary forest carbon offset project. A wide governance structure laying emphasis on benefit balance, equality, and information exchanges and being regulated by all stakeholders has been constructed. It facilitates the agreement among the stakeholders with conflicting or different interests. The joint participation of stakeholders in voluntary forest carbon offset projects might change the government-dominated afforestation/reforestation into a market, where all participators including government are encouraged to cooperate with each other to improve the condition of fund shortage and low efficiency.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104225872110384
Author(s):  
Weiwen Li ◽  
Garry D. Bruton ◽  
Xinchun Li ◽  
Shuang Wang

A transgenerational leadership transition is one of the most critical events in the life cycle of family firms. Drawing upon the myopic loss aversion (MLA) perspective, we argue that outgoing leaders and other company stakeholders tend to closely watch the later-generation successors immediately after a transgenerational succession, and thus the successors will focus on short-term developments and invest less in R&D activities. Employing the difference-in-differences approach, we find empirical support for our argument that transgenerational succession decreases R&D intensity. The negative effect of transgenerational succession is more pronounced when the later-generation successors suffer from a higher level of MLA.


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